Showing posts with label parmenides. Show all posts
Showing posts with label parmenides. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Q8: Based on the readings available to you in Curd, compare and contrast Heraclitus and Parmenides in regard to their view of reason (logos) and thought, and the interplay between reason, thought and fundamental reality


8.  Based on the readings available to you in Curd, compare and contrast Heraclitus and Parmenides in regard to their view of reason (logos) and thought, and the interplay between reason, thought and fundamental reality.

I asked Schultz for clarification of this question since it was new in 2011 and thus unprecedented.  I think that the question is trying to get us to give an overview of H & P’s understanding of the arche and what the nature of that arche means for how we discover it and subsequently think about it.  Here is her advice for how to approach it:

Each philosopher has a conception of the arche (first principle-ultimate reality).
What is it?
What is different about how each sees ultimate reality?
What implications does each view have for how we come to understand that reality and what implications does it have for how we order our lives, view philosophy itself?
It is a good practice to do that for each philosopher. What is their view of truth? How do we have access to it? What does that view of truth say about human individuality, relationality, responsibility... etc.?


1. Rough outlines of views on the fundamental reality (arche)
a.     For Heraclitus
                                               i.     arche = logos
                                             ii.     key idea: unity in diversity
                                            iii.     the obvious: the plurality in the world, that everything is in a state of flux.
                                            iv.     the not obvious: how we are to account for the unity in the plurality, what the unifying principle is.  (Hint: it’s logos)
                                             v.     logos is the universal law or reason governing all things, binding them into a unity. (In the same way that a law governing a system makes the system one thing?)
                                            vi.     Why fire is an appropriate analogy: Fire is always changing and has no continuity. But how it consumes and kindles (the “upward” and “downward” paths) are governed by law; it gives as much as it takes (e.g. by the law of conservation of energy). So we can still recognize fire and understand it.

b.     For Parmenides
                                               i.     arche = Being (or What-is)
                                             ii.     key idea: Being is one, whole, continuous, unchanging, eternal
                                            iii.     the obvious: plurality and change are false (conclusions drawn from the sensible are bad and unconvincing)
                                            iv.     the not obvious: there is no change; everything is only one thing; only abstract reasoning can get you the truth

2. Differences
a.     Heraclitus and Parmenides disagree not only on the content of the arche but also on what an arche is at all.  Is it a material cause? Efficient? Formal?
b.     For H, becoming is fundamental.  For P, being is fundamental.

3. What these views imply about understanding reality? How do you reason to/about the arche?
a.     For Parmenides, thinking about what-isn’t is fruitless if not impossible.  Since nothing at all is true of unbeing, it can’t be thought about.  And he thinks that the way things appear to us (changing, perishing, diverse, etc.) can’t be the case, so they can’t be thought about.  We just can’t have true and persuasive thoughts about sensible things (er, so-called things).  All such thoughts are deceitful, fit for stupid mortals.  To get to the arche, just reason about it, purely abstractly.  To think about the arche, likewise reason abstractly
b.     For Heraclitus, on the other hand, the arche is something we get to by considering the stuff that Parmenides categorizes as what-isn’t.  From there, we can recognize the governing logos.  If we are to really understand anything at all, we must first understand logos and reconcile with it even though “humans prove unable to understand [this logos] both before hearing it and when they have first heard it.” (22B1)  
                                               i.     (B114) “Those who speak with understanding must rely firmly on what is common to all as a city must rely on [its?] law, and much more firmly.  For all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine law […]”
                                             ii.     (B72) “They are at odds with the logos, with which above all they are in continuous contact, and the things they met every day appear strange to them.

Q3: Explain the significance of the opening Parmenides’ Proem for our understanding of Parmenides’ conception of Being


3. Explain the significance of the opening Parmenides’ Proem for our understanding of Parmenides’ conception of Being.


1. Some relevant features of the opening of the proem:
a.     Introduction to the two paths of inquiry
                                               i.     The opening of proem affords Parmenides the opportunity to outline his program.  The goddess’s revelation will come in the following two phases:

1.   along the path of Persuasion (“the unshaken heart of well-persuasive Truth”)  This path “is and it is necessary that it be”.
2.   along the unlearnable path of mortal opinion (“in which there is no true trust”, “a path entirely unable to be investigated”)  This path “is not and it is necessary that it not be.”

b.     Involves divinity
                                               i.     The proem provides justification for Parmenides’ account of being because it enables him to distinguish his view of being from common mortal opinion (i.e. put it firmly along the path of Persuasion). Here’s how:

1.   The goddess is divine and so distinct from common mortals.  So the account is revelatory, not merely as a product of mortal reflection.

                                             ii.     Bonus: even though the goddess reveals the account of Being, it is also one that can be reached by reason (as long as it’s purely abstract), so Parmenides can (and does) provide arguments for support.

2. Parmenides’ conception of Being
a.     Being is one, whole, eternal, unchanging

b.     ONE, WHOLE
                                               i.     What would divide being?  Non-being?  Nope.
                                             ii.     “what-is draws to what-is”

c.     ETERNAL
                                               i.     Everything that comes into being either comes from being or from nonbeing.
                                             ii.     If it comes from being, then it already is. (so: ungenerated)
                                            iii.     If it comes from nonbeing, then nonbeing is. (absurd)
                                            iv.     Nothing can come from nonbeing.
                                             v.     So being always is.

(Run the argument along similar lines to get that Being is imperishable.  If it goes into nonbeing, it would become nothing, but nothing doesn’t exist.)

  possibly helpful secondary source: “To see why Parmenides drew this conclusion we have to assume that he thought that 'being water' or 'being air' was related to 'being' in the same way as 'running fast' and 'running slowly' is related to 'running'. Someone who first runs fast and then runs slowly, all the time goes on running; similarly, for Parmenides, stuff which is first water and then is air goes on being.” (Kenny 12)

d.     UNCHANGING
                                               i.     If generation and destruction are impossible, then change is impossible.
                                             ii.     Generation and destruction are impossible (see 2c here.)
                                            iii.     So, change is impossible

“But unchanging in the limits of great bonds / it is without starting or ceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing / have wandered very far away” (8.26)

e.     What is this argument for?
                                               i.     Anything we can think or speak about either exists or it doesn’t.
                                             ii.     What does not exist is nothing.
                                            iii.     So we cannot think or speak about nothing. (Because unbeing is that of which nothing is true.)
                                            iv.     We can only think or speak about what exists.

3. The proem and the account
The path that Parmenides took in defending his account (i.e. abstract, rationalistic, removed from the deceit of mortal (sensation riddled) judgment) is the way of persuasion that the goddess introduced in the proem.