49. Describe Aristotle’s account
of how we acquire both moral and intellectual virtue. How do the moral and intellectual virtues contribute to
eudaimonia (happiness)?
I)
Intro
A) Set-up
1) The context in NE
B) Overview
1) The moral and
intellectual virtues correspond to different parts of the soul, and are
acquired in ways fitting to those parts: moral virtue deals with the appetitive
and is acquired (primarily) by habituation, while intellectual virtue deals
with the rational and is acquired (primarily) by education. The virtues contribute to eudaimonia in
as much as eudaimonia consists in fulfilling one’s function well, which for
humans requires the virtuous activity
of the rational part of the soul.
C) Map
1) Acquisition of the virtues
2) The virtues and eudaimonia
II)
Acquisition of the virtues
A) The division of human virtue corresponds with the
parts of the soul
1) The
Elements of the Soul
(a) Non-rational part
(i) Nutrition and growth (not distinctive
of humans)
(ii) Sense-perception (not distinctive: shared
with other animals)
(b) Rational part
(i) The rational part has two parts
(i) One part has reason and thinking in
itself
(ii) One part [the part related to
impulse, appetite, desire] is responsive to the reason in the other part
1. In one
sense, this part is nonrational; in another, rational
2. If the
impulse-driven part of the soul can be said to posses reason, it is reason in
the sense that one listens to good advice; it does not have reason or knowledge
itself, but is ready to listen to it
2) Moral virtue
(a) Associated with the appetitive part that listens to
reason
(b) Arise (primarily) through
habituation
(i) Yet, education also
required, e.g., for prudence (see below)
3) Intellectual virtue
(a) Associated with the purely rational part
(b) Arise (primarily) through
learning
(II.i)
(i) Yet, moral virtue
necessary to attain the external aids needed for intellectual virtue
B) Description of the process of virtue acquisition
[Kraig Martin]
1) Summary: To become virtuous, one needs to be brought up in such a way that
allows one to be taught proper starting points or some correct individual
judgments concerning what is noble and just. Then, one needs to come to know that these judgments are true, and one needs to make that
knowledge part of one’s nature.
This happens through habituation and is aided by phronesis and
experience–one begins by doing virtuous acts without yet being virtuous, and
gradually becomes virtuous thereby; thereafter, virtuous deeds flow from virtue. After one comes to know the starting
points, then one can come to understand why noble things are noble.
2) First, we need to begin with
the “starting points” (or the “that”).
(1.4)
(a) We gain some of the
“starting points” of moral education by habituation, perhaps necessarily in our
youth. (1.7)
3) Second, we come to know the starting points (judgments
regarding individual cases of the noble and just), as opposed to merely having
been taught the starting points.
(a) “Knowing” the starting
points is not just having been taught them. It is having come to see that the judgments are true. They need to become second nature to
the moral learner.
4) Third,
once one knows
the proper starting points, then one can begin to understand “the because”; that is, why the noble and
just things are noble and just.
(a) (I am not sure if Aristotle
thought that a virtuous person necessarily understands “the because.”)
5) When (a) one has been taught
the starting points (“the that”) and (b) one has really come to know the
staring points (that is, one knows that the individual judgments of what is
noble and just are true and one has that knowledge as part of one’s nature),
and (c) one has come to understand “the because” (that is, one understands why
noble and just things are noble and just), then one’s moral education is
complete and one has become virtuous.
III) The virtues
and eudaimonia
A) (For more detail, see Q#44)
B)
Function: If a
being has a function, its good/flourishing depends on that function
1) Humans have a function, so their
good/flourishing depends on it
2) The human function: activity of the
part of the soul that has reason (1098a)
3) Thus, the human good: “the soul’s
activity that expresses virtue.” (1098a)
4) So human flourishing consists in
virtuous activity of the rational soul
(a) The highest flourishing is especially
linked with the purely rational (intellectual virtue)
(b) But flourishing also requires moral
virtue
C)
Three potential ways of life (i.e., routes to
happiness)
1) Life of
pleasure: ruled out as vulgar
2) Political
life: happy in a secondary way
(a) It
involves the character virtues and the exercise of reason, thus the
development of the intellectual virtues mentioned in book VI. However, it lacks
the full development of the understanding and the full exercise of wisdom
3) Contemplative life: the ideal life
(a) The
contemplative life requires intellectual virtue
(i) “Reason is
the highest faculty of man, and theoretic contemplation is the highest activity
of reason.”
(ii) Theoretical
contemplation is an intellectual virtue, which includes two other intellectual
virtues: scientific knowledge and understanding.
(b) The life of
contemplation also requires moral virtue.
(i) The moral
virtues provide the external goods needed to develop intellectual virtue
(ii) We are not
meant to see the political and contemplative lives in opposition to each other.
The philosopher, qua human, should have all of the same virtues as the
politician. He simply has the extra virtue of wisdom.
D) Is virtue
sufficient for eudaimonia?
1) No – one
also needs certain external goods
2) Further
note: eudaimonia requires a complete life.
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