Q59 ~ In Book III of On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine worries about the consistency of a pair of statements or truths: (1) God foreknows all future events and (2) human beings sin freely. What is Augustine’s solution to this apparent dilemma? Identify and discuss its strengths and weaknesses. Compare Augustine’s solution to Boethius’ discussion of the topic of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in the final book of The Consolation of Philosophy.

59.  In Book III of On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine worries about the consistency of a pair of statements or truths:  (1) God foreknows all future events and (2) human beings sin freely.  What is Augustine’s solution to this apparent dilemma?  Identify and discuss its strengths and weaknesses.  Compare Augustine’s solution to Boethius’ discussion of the topic of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in the final book of The Consolation of Philosophy.

RW: Previous outlines were good; I only slightly edited/reorganized.  Solid resource: Paul Spade, Medievals in a Box, chapter 22.  2009/10 followed Spade more than 2011 did; I do as well.

I)     Intro

A)   Setup

1)    The dialectic: both authors are concerned with the problem of evil, and use free will to solve it.  But how can we have free will if God foreknows our actions?

B)    Overview of solutions

1)    Augustine offers a solution according to which freedom is lack of external constraint, and argues that God’s foreknowledge does not constrain us.  Boethius offers a solution according to which freedom includes the ability to do otherwise, and God does not foreknow our free acts, but knows them in an eternal present.

C)    Map

1)    Augustine’s solution

2)    Strengths and weaknesses

3)    Boethius’ solution

4)    Comparison of the views (highlighting strengths and weaknesses of Boethius’)

II)   Augustine’s solution

A)   Augustine’s account of free will

1)    Freedom = Lack of external constraint [with Spade/2009/10, contra 2011]

(a)   Even if it is (logically) necessary that an agent commit act X, that does not mean that the agent is not free with regard to act X, as long as that agent is free from external constraint in choosing to do X. 

2)    What about PAP?

(a)   PAP = Principle of alternative possibilities (the idea that in order for X to be done freely it must also have been possible for the agent not to do X)

(b)   Evodius initially seems committed to PAP, suggesting that, “No guilt can be found where nature and necessity rule.”  But he eventually accedes to Augustine.

(c)   Augustine appears to reject PAP. 

(i)    Spade notes that Augustine seems to confuse the two accounts of freedom, responding to Evodius’ PAP-inspired objection with lack-of-constraint talk.

(d)   NOTE: Some say denying PAP makes Augustine a compatibilist. Stump counts Augustine as a libertarian of sorts, even without PAP (see Cambridge Companion).  For comps: probably best not to use these modern labels.)

B)    Two arguments that our will is free of external constraint, even if it is foreknown:

1)    Our will can’t be coerced (“Nothing at all, whether superior, equal, or inferior, can coerce the will.”):

(a)   The things that could cause a man to choose evil must be either worse, as good as, or better than the will.

(b)   There is justice in the ordering of the universe.

(c)   If something is better than or as good as the will, then it will not cause the will to choose evil, for it will be at least as virtuous as the will is.

(d)   If something is worse than the will, then it cannot cause it to choose evil, because it will be more vicious (and so weaker).

(e)   Therefore, nothing can cause a man to will evil, and he must will freely (i.e., without constraint).

2)    Foreknowledge of an outcome doesn’t cause that outcome:

(a)   Human foreknowledge should be just as problematic as divine foreknowledge. (Foreknowledge necessitates that what is foreknown will occur—if it does not occur, then, by definition, it isn’t foreknowledge.)

(b)   But it seems clear that human foreknowledge doesn’t cause the thing it foreknows, just as human memory does not cause the thing it remembers. (Though in each case the thing is necessary.)

(c)   So, foreknowledge doesn’t contrain the will.

C)    Conclusion: It is consistent to say God foreknows our freely willed sins. 

1)    God’s foreknowledge of my sin logically entails that I will sin

2)    Yet God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of my sin. 

(a)   Rather, in a sense, my will causes God’s knowledge.

3)    The cause of my action is my will.

4)    Since God’s foreknowledge does not constrain my will, my will is free.

5)    Thus, human responsibility for sin and divine foreknowledge are both maintained 

III) Strengths and weaknesses of Augustine’s solution

A)   Strengths

1)    Affirms both divine foreknowledge and human responsibility for sin/evil

2)    Accounts for the compatibility of free will with all infallible foreknowledge (including human), not just God’s infallible foreknowledge

3)    Avoids the difficulty (impossibility?) of having to reconcile PAP with necessity.

4)    [Perhaps: Augustine seems to maintain PAP for pre-Fall sin, and grounds our moral responsibility for sins we cannot avoid in Adam’s sin.  Thus moral responsibility has some root in PAP.  (Weakness: But if Adam had PAP freedom, how did God foreknow his sin without necessitating it?)]

B)    Weaknesses

1)    Many people think PAP is intuitively plausible. While Augustine seems to reject PAP (at least post-Fall), he never overtly addresses Evodius on the issue or gives clear reasons for this rejection.

(a)   Some go a slightly different direction, and doubt whether Augustine thought he was rejecting PAP at all, in which case the problem seems primarily to be one of having a confused account. (Some read his discussion of original sin as affirming PAP. [Past outliners say this—I’m unsure.  Thus “perhaps” in III.A.4 above.])

2)    Free creation: Augustine affirms PAP for God’s act of creation (cf. Plotinian creation is free only in the lack-of-constraint sense).  Is his account of freedom compatible with his doctrine of creation?

3)    Augustine doesn’t defend his claim that God knows the future actions of free agents beyond rejecting its denial as heretical. (Modern open theists would question this move.)

IV) Boethius’ solution

A)   Boethius’ account of free will

1)    Boethius accepts PAP

2)    Thus, he explicitly rejects views according to which the problem can be “solved” simply through the order of causation (Augustine’s?): whether our deeds are caused by God’s foreknowledge, or are free from external constraint and are the causes of his foreknowledge, the point is the same—the event foreseen is necessary and must happen. And “this alone is enough to remove freedom of the will.” (Book V. 3)

B)    Two types of necessity

1)    Simple necessity – X could not have been otherwise (i.e., [box]X)

(a)   E.g., necessarily, 2+2=4.

2)    Conditional necessity – X could not have been otherwise, given some other condition (i.e., [box](P→X))

(a)   E.g., if a man is walking, then necessarily he is walking.

(b)   A free/contingent event can have this sort of necessity.

C)    Knowledge and Divine Eternity

1)    What can be known is determined by the cognitive faculties of the knower, NOT the things themselves.

(a)   E.g., knowing roundness

(i)    Senses grasp sensible particulars that are present to the sense organs.

(ii)  Imagination still grasps particulars, but they don't have be present.

(iii) Reason grasps universals. (This is the highest human way of knowing.)

(iv) Intelligence grasps "the simple form itself." (God alone has intelligence.)

2)    God’s eternal intelligence

(a)   Eternity = “the whole, simultaneous, and complete possession of interminable life.”  (I.e., God is not spread out over time; God exists as a whole all at once.)

(b)   God’s intelligence is eternal

(c)   So God does not foreknow our free acts; rather, He knows them in an eternal present.

D)   Putting It All Together

1)    If an event is foreknown, that event is simply necessary.  However, if an event is known (simplicter), that event is only conditionally necessary (and so does not threaten the event’s freedom).

2)    God does not foreknow our free acts; rather, He knows them in an eternal present.

3)    Since God knows our free acts (and does not foreknow them), those acts are conditionally necessary, but not simply necessary.

(a)   Necessarily, (God knows p → p)

(b)   God knows p.

(c)   So, p. (not [box]p)

4)    Therefore, divine (fore)knowledge is compatible with human freedom (even of the PAP variety).

V)   Comparison of the two views (highlighting strengths and weaknesses of Boethius’)

A)   Similarities

1)    Both have omniscience and free will.

(a)   Boethius accomplishes this with a stronger form of freedom.

2)    Neither defends the claim that God knows future free acts.  (Weakness for both.)

B)    Differences

1)    Boethius is much clearer about the nature of necessity

(a)   A huge step forward!

2)    Different solutions for different views of free will

(a)   For PAP-fans, Boethius’ solution is an improvement.

(b)   Boethius’ response is stronger in a sense, since it works for a stronger version of freedom, while also working for Augustine’s account of freedom (note: Augustine agrees with Boethius that God is eternal).

3)    Boethius’ solution can’t account for the compatibility of human foreknowledge and free acts

(a)   Cf., Augustine’s does.