Q38: Compare Plato’s account of the soul’s powers in Republic 4 with Aristotle’s account of them in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13. [New in 2011:] What are the strengths and weaknesses of each account and which do you find more compelling overall?

38. Compare Plato’s account of the soul’s powers in Republic 4 with Aristotle’s account of them in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13. [New in 2011:] What are the strengths and weaknesses of each account and which do you find more compelling overall?

1.   Plato

a. appetitive, spirited, rational

                                               i.     appetite: the part of the soul that desires food, sex, money, etc.

                                             ii.     spirit: the part of the soul that desires things like honor and winning.

                                            iii.     rational: the part of the soul that reflects

b. Basis for distinction:

                                               i.     the principle of non-contrariety: if X and Y are contrary relations, nothing can unqualifiedly stand in X and Y to the same thing; and desire and aversion are contrary relations.  So simultaneous desire and aversion indicates that there are different things (in this case, soul parts) that have those relations.

                                             ii.     Appetitive and reasonable are different: Appetite and reason can act in contrary ways, such when thirsting to drink (appetite) and knowing one should not drink (reason).  btw, appetite is fundamentally irrational and must be subdued by reason.

                                            iii.     Spirited and appetitive are different: The spirited part has desires contrary to the appetitive, like when Leontius was angry at his (appetitive) desire to look at the dead bodies down by the Piraeus.

                                            iv.     Spirited and appetitive are different from rational: The rational part is not emotional.

c. Division is reflected in parts of a city:

                                               i.     Ruling: rational

                                             ii.     Guardians: spirited

                                            iii.     Other citizens: appetitive

2.   Aristotle

a. vegetative, appetitive/sensitive, rational

                                               i.     vegetative: responsible for nourishment and growth; irrelevant to ethics

                                             ii.     appetitive: responsible for desires and passion; corresponds to Plato’s appetitive & spirited; is under the control of reason; is the seat of the moral virtues

                                            iii.     rational: is the seat of the intellectual virtues

b. Basis for distinction:

                                               i.     functional: they all have different functions (see above), so they’re all different parts.

                                             ii.     Vegetative and rational are different: the vegetative part is working even when a man is sleeping and the rational part isn’t working.  Humans are alive when they sleep, and thus have a soul in act, but they aren’t reasoning, and so reason is not in act.

                                            iii.     Vegetative and appetitive are different: this part perceives sensible, particular forms.  It desires.  Unlike the vegetative part, it participates in reason, can be persuaded by it.

                                            iv.     Rational and the others are different: the rational part perceives intellectual, universal forms.  It is guided by the intellectual virtues.

c. Division reflected in the genre of living things.

                                               i.     Humans: rational

                                             ii.     Animals: sensitive

                                            iii.     Plants: vegetative

3.   Strengths and Weaknesses - Possibilities

                                               i.     It depends on what you’re trying to do.  Aristotle’s division is really good if you’re trying to do virtue ethics b/c the division of the soul matches the kind-division of virtues.  But Plato’s is good for…? Illustrating that justice is the three parts existing harmoniously and is thus in the interest of ones who have it?

                                             ii.     Plato’s basis for distinction is not great.  The principle of non-contrariety is only true for Plato’s forms.