72. Thomas Aquinas gives an account of
the ultimate end that incorporates Aristotle's view of human happiness. Discuss
the difficulties of this enterprise.
Aristotle’s
Account of Human Happiness and The Proper End of Humans
·
All
seek happiness, which is complete and self-sufficient.
·
Happiness
is the best good for a human. The best
good for a thing is fulfilling its function. The function of man is the
activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
o
This
is the end of all human actions and can be achieved in this life.
·
Happiness
is the good activity of all of the capacities’ of man’s soul, but is fulfilled
in the activity that perfects the best part of man in contemplation of the best
thing, namely the Prime Mover. Presumably the philosopher who contemplates the
highest objects also has the moral virtues, but the life of contemplation is
the happiest life.
o
We
never get all the contemplation we want though since life is filled with
struggles and difficulties and our bodies hinder us.
Aquinas’ Modification
of Aristotle’s Account
·
Aquinas
agrees with that Aristotle that all men naturally seek happiness—it is the end
of all actions.
·
Aquinas
also agrees that happiness lies in the fulfillment of man’s function, which is
that activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. More specifically, Aquinas agrees with
Aristotle that the most complete happiness comes in contemplation of the
greatest thing—namely God.
·
The
difference is that Aquinas calls this happiness incomplete or imperfect. Aristotle’s happiness is the best that can be
achieved by man in this life, but a greater happiness awaits us in the life to
come.
o
Keep
in mind, imperfect happiness is still a great thing. It’s just not the best thing ever.
o
Aquinas,
however, wouldn’t consider this a difference between Aristotle and
himself. Aquinas interprets Aristotle as
saying that perfect happiness is divine and exceeds human nature.
·
Perfect
happiness is the complete fulfillment and perfection of the intellect and the
will.
o
Like
Aristotle, Aquinas emphasizes the importance of intellectual activity in
happiness. It is an activity of the
senses only in the resurrection where the senses will be perfected.
o
The
intellect is perfected by the attainment of truth. The will is perfected by the attainment of
the universal good, which is the object of our desires and the end of our will.
o
These
cannot be achieved in this life.
§
The
intellect is fulfilled when we see the divine essence (when we “see God as He
is”) but this is “beyond the nature of any created intellect.”
§
The
will is fulfilled when all of our desires are fulfilled, but this is not
possible in this life since we are sinful and never entirely free from various
evils and difficulties.
o
Ultimately,
we find absolute truth and goodness (the answers to all our questions and the
fulfillment of all our desires) in God.
Difficulties
with the Account
·
Do
humans really have an objective function?
Many contemporary philosophers would say no.
o
On
naturalism, it is indeed hard to see how humans could have a function. However, Aquinas thinks he can prove the
existence of God. If he can do so then
humans having functions becomes much easier to explain.
·
Is
there really only one end that all humans seek?
Some seek money, others pleasure, and still others honor or virtue. How can one argue that all men seek the same
thing?
o
Aquinas
handles this by saying that all men seek happiness but they disagree about what
happiness consists in.
·
How
can human happiness consist in something that exceeds our nature? It is odd to say that the ultimate end of man
is something that it is impossible for him to naturally achieve.
o
Aquinas
might say something like the following: Normal
human happiness (or imperfect happiness)
consists in the fulfillment of normal human nature. This is a great thing, but God has something
even greater in store for us. God, in
his grace, has decided to perfect us so that he can give us an even greater
happiness. It is not odd that God would
work in this way, though it is certainly something worth rejoicing about.
·
What
of the body? By making happiness
primarily intellectual do we alienate the body?
o
Aquinas
says that the body is not necessary for happiness, but because the perfection
of the soul qua form requires a body, the soul wishes the body to participate
in happiness with it. The body must be perfected, though.
·
Is
Aquinas’s account of happiness too intellectual? Aquinas emphasizes that the
proper end of man is the perfection of the will and the intellect. But what place for the will is there in the
beatific vision? Is the intellect given
too much priority?
·
Another
problem is the isolating nature of the beatific vision. Many think that our ultimate happiness should
include relationships and community with other humans, but if we are
continually contemplating God’s essence will we be able to have such
relationships?
82. Compare the views of Aquinas and
Bonaventure on the respective roles of intellect and will (or affection) in
human beatitude. Then choose one of the two figures, and discuss how he might
try to convince the other (a) that his own view is correct, but (b) that it can
incorporate the valuable insights from the other view.
Aquinas
(I.II.3.4, I.II.4.1-2, etc.)
·
Intellect: fulfilled by seeing the divine essence (the
beatific vision).
·
Will: rests after the vision is attained (and all
desires are satisfied); delights in that vision (as the proper accident of the
beatific vision).
·
For
Aquinas, human beatitude is primarily an intellectual activity—seeing God as He
is, or the beatific vision. A righteous
will is required to attain the beatific vision, but blessedness is not
primarily an act of the will.
·
Since
people are more or less capable of enjoying God’s essence, there are degrees of
beatitude.
Bonaventure
·
Intellect: Prepares the mind for charity, but this
cannot happen without affection.
o
The
first 6 steps towards God are intellectual activities of beholding God (in
various ways). These activities kindle
desire for union with God.
o
Some
may pursue beatitude through the intellect, but this is a special vocation and
thus not for everyone (C.f. endnote 172).
Bonaventure had it, however.
o
For
people with this vocation, intellectual mysticism is possible. For most people, however, beatitude is the
mysticism described in chapter 7, in which intellectual activity is
relinquished.
o
We
get no direct beatific vision/knowledge of God’s essence; we get union with
God, but also superluminous darkness in which God is supremely unknown.
·
Will: Love (as affection and charity) prepares us
for our beatitude.
o
For
the seventh step’s mystical union, we must turn towards God and behold Christ
with faith, hope, love, devotion, admiration, joy, appreciation, praise, and
rejoicing.
o
These
are desires for God, not our human desires.
o
We
should pray for consuming affections that inflame us and transport us to God.
o
We
are crucified with Christ and are with him in Paradise.
o
This
is possible for all. There need be no
degrees of beatitude for Bonaventure’s view to be coherent.
Aquinas
contra Bonaventure
Aquinas’s human
function argument might sway Bonaventure.
We share will with animals, but we don’t share the intellect. So the intellect is our distinctive human
function and thus part of our ultimate happiness. Bonaventure might respond that, on his view, human
intellect still plays a distinct part in human happiness (versus animal
happiness) in that it is needed to prepare our wills for union with God. But Aquinas could insist that intellectual
activity is the most noble human
activity as well. Thus we have good
reason to think that beatitude consists at least partially, if not primarily,
in intellectual activity.
Aquinas might
argue that he gets perfection of the intellect and perfection of the will,
whereas Bonaventure only gets perfection of the will. One way to parse out this thought is as
follows: one who is perfectly happy
lacks nothing—they have no unsatisfied desires.
But we naturally desire to know things.
Specifically, we desire to know God.
Thus, perfect happiness must include us coming to see the essence of
God. If Bonaventure claims that coming
to know the divine essence is a part of his six steps, then Aquinas can appeal
to arguments about divine simplicity and the nature of our intellect to show
why we cannot come to know God as He is except through grace in heaven. Thus, if we are to have all our desires
fulfilled, we must be given the beatific vision in heaven.
Aquinas could
incorporate insights from Bonaventure in a couple of ways. One, Aquinas believes that we can come to
know things about God through his effects (for example Aquinas’s five
ways). Bonaventure offers some
additional ways in which we might learn things about God through his creation
that seems compatible with Aquinas’s system.
Two, Bonaventure seems to correctly notice that in-depth intellectual
activity is not a part of many (or most) people’s relationship with God. Perhaps his account of beatitude is crafted
to fit the sort of individuals that see Aquinas’s account as overly
intellectual. Recognizing this, Aquinas
might do more to explain to these people how his account can accommodate them.
Bonaventure
Contra Aquinas
Bonaventure
might deny that beatific vision is possible—that is, it is impossible for a
creature like man to come to know God as He is in Himself. If so, something other than the intellect
must lead to our beatitude. Or
Bonaventure might make a more modest claim and say that the beatific vision is
impossible for at least some people
(say, because they lack the intellectual capabilities). If this were so, then God would want to
provide them with a beatitude that did not consist in the beatific vision.
Bonaventure
could incorporate some of Aquinas’s project in a substantial way. Bonaventure seems open to saying that some
people, with special vocations, are able to achieve an intellectual mystical
union with God. Bonaventure could appeal
to Aquinas’s work on the beatific vision to fill in the details of what this
intellectual mysticism might consist in.
But for those who lack this intellectual vocation, Bonaventure could
retain his account of beatitude absent intellectual activity. Or if he was convinced by some of Aquinas’s
arguments, he might try to craft a limited role for the intellectual in
beatitude—a role that allows the intellect to play some part in beatitude
without becoming overly dominant.
87. Not everything that a sovereign wills
is law. Explain what conditions, according to Aquinas, need to be satisfied for
something willed by a sovereign to be a law. Illustrate the criteria by making
up a piece of proposed city legislation to prohibit men and women from standing
each other up on romantic dates (with some fairly reasonable exceptions), and
discuss what, according to Thomas, would have to be the case for such a piece
of legislation to become a piece of legitimate law in Waco.
For Aquinas, law
is
- an ordinance (genus) of reason (specific difference)
- “Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting. … Now the rule of human acts
is reason, which is the first principle of human acts … since it belong
to reason to direct to the end. … Consequently, it follows that law is
something pertaining to reason.” (Q90A1)
- for the common good (final cause)
- The aim of human actions is happiness, which is the
human good, and a law is a rule concerning human action. Thus, the law aims at the human
good—specifically the common good
(the good of all in the community) since the nature of law is to be a
rule over many. (Q90A2)
- made by the people of the community’s representative
(efficient cause)
- Since the law governs the whole community, “the making
of law belongs to the whole people or to a public personage who has care
of the whole people.” (Q90A3)
- and is promulgated (necessary condition).
- “In order that law obtain the binding force which is
proper to law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled
by it. Such application is made by
its being notified to them by promulgation.” (Q90A4)
Proposed
legislation: (YOU DON’T HAVE TO READ
THIS IF YOU DON’T WANT)
·
If
person 1 and person 2 have mutually and voluntarily agreed to meet at a certain
time and place for a joint activity—specifically an activity aimed at developing
their personal romantic relationship—then neither person 1 nor person 2 may
fail to show up to said activity unless they meet the conditions listed in the
EXCEPTIONS section.
·
EXCEPTIONS
o
Either
party may fail to show up for the joint activity (i.e. cancel the joint
activity) if they have notified the other party that they will be absent a
reasonable amount of time in advance.
§
A
reasonable amount of time in advance is defined as the amount of time in
advance of the activity at which a reasonable person would guess that neither
party has invested significant time, money, or effort into the joint
activity. For instance, say person 1 is
six hours away from going to a sold out concert with person 2, who is
purchasing the tickets for the event. A
reasonable person would guess that person 2 has already invested significant
money to buy the tickets for the concert.
Thus person 1 cannot cancel the activity under this exception. On the other hand, if it is one hour before a
dinner-date, then a reasonable person would guess that person 2 had not spent
any money or effort besides making a reservation and would be able to cancel
the activity under this exception.
o
If
it is within the time designated in the previous exception, then the activity
may be canceled with notification
given these conditions:
§
You
are unable to get the activity without tremendous effort (effort that significantly
outweighs any effort that the other person can reasonably be concluded to have
already invested in the activity).
·
E.g.
Your car breaks down and you are unable to get to the dinner date without a
$100 taxi ride.
§
Some
kind of emergency comes up and notification is not overly difficult.
·
E.g.
Your elderly father dies and you must immediately fly home, and you are not so
distraught that you are unable to text the other person.
§
Some
exceptional opportunity becomes available and you have reasonably easy means of
notification.
·
E.g.
You run into your favorite musical artist and he or she offers to immediately
fly you to Europe to see them in concert and hang out with them after.
§
You
reasonably conclude that going to the activity will cause you or the other
person serious moral, emotional, or physical damage and you have reasonably
easy means of notification.
o
If
it is within the time designated in the first exception, then the activity may
be canceled without notification
given these conditions (though the abandoned party must be notified as soon as
reasonably possible):
§
You
are unable to get to the activity without tremendous effort and you are without
means of notification.
·
E.g.
Your car breaks down and you have no cell-phone signal.
§
You
are somehow seriously incapacitated.
·
E.g.
In a coma. Have a nervous breakdown.
§
There
is some kind of emergency that requires all of your focus and it would hinder
your effectiveness to try to go to the activity or notify the other person.
·
E.g.
Your best friend is seriously considering suicide and you are talking with him
or her. You are being attacked by someone.
§
Some
exceptional opportunity becomes available and you have no reasonably easy means
of notification.
§
You
reasonably conclude that going to the activity will cause you or the other
person serious moral, emotional, or physical damage and you have no reasonably
easy means of notification.
§
You
genuinely forget about the date after having put forth reasonable effort to
remember it.
·
In
order for this legislation to become a law, the four conditions listed at the
top must be met. That is:
o
The
legislation must be an ordinance of reason.
§
The
law must be carefully thought through and the statutes reasonably lead to the
desired end. With more detail added to
the proposed legislation, this end could easily be met.
o
The
legislation is directed at the common good.
§
We
must determine that this law really does promote the common good. I’m not so sure it does. If you take the time to build in all the
reasonable exceptions, then the only time people would be in violation of the
law is when they cancel dates without showing any courtesy or concern for the
well-being of the other person. Someone
who would do this is likely very selfish and inconsiderate. Thus, it might actually be better to be stood
up by such a person that to have a date with this person during which they
might deceive you as to their real character and you might become emotionally
attached. At that point, the
relationship would likely only end in a painful breakup or a permanent
relationship to the wrong sort of person.
Then again perhaps these inconsiderate people would begin to be more
thoughtful about who they agree to date if this law were in place. So I’m not sure whether this law is for the
common good.
o
The
legislation has to be passed by the community’s representative.
§
So
the law must be passed by the government of Waco.
o
The
legislation must be promulgated.
§
I’m
not sure how far this must go. Is it
sufficient if the city publishes a newspaper ad about the law and then posts it
in public records? Or do they need to
have a more significant campaign? Either
way, the people must be alerted that the law is in effect in some way.
88. Explain Anselm’s argument for the existence of God and discuss Gaunilo’s major objections to the argument. What refinement to the argument does Scotus propose?
92. Explain Anselm's argument for the
existence of God and discuss Gaunilo’s major objections to the argument. In
your view, does Anselm or Gaunilo prevail?
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
v
DEFINITION: God is “that than which
nothing greater can be thought (TNG).”
§
(Contemporary translation: greatest
possible being.)
Ø
not
“the greatest thing that can be thought,” since Anselm does
not claim that he can be thought
Ø
nor
is he “that which is greater than
everything else,” since that is not enough to get the argument off the
ground, since it presupposes that the thing is actual.
v
ARGUMENT:
Ø
Premise
#1: That than which nothing greater can be thought exists in
the understanding.
·
(Contemporary translation: God’s
existence is possible.)
§
Support for premise #1:
even the fool understands the concept of “that than which nothing greater can
be thought” when he hears the words; therefore, it exists in his understanding.
·
(Contemporary translation:
conceivability is a guide to possibility; God’s existence is conceivable;
therefore it is possible.)
Ø
Premise
#2: If that than which nothing greater can be thought exists
in the understanding, then it exists in reality as well.
·
(Contemporary
translation: if God’s existence is possible, then it is actual.)
§
First argument in support of #2
(chap. 2):
·
(i)
Something is greater if it exists in the understanding and in reality than if
it exists in the understanding alone.
(i.e. to exist is greater than to not exist);
·
(ii)
therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be conceived does not exist, I
can conceive of a greater thing (a thing with all the same characteristics
which actually does exist).
·
(iii)
But then that than which a greater cannot
be conceived would be that than which a greater can be conceived – a contradiction.
·
So,
that than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in reality if it exists in
the understanding.
(Commonly
thought Anselm uses the underlying principle: existence is a perfection, a
great-making property. Spade challenges
this. Rather, something like it is
better for G to exist than not exist)
§
Second argument in support of #2
(chap. 3):
·
(i) A thing that cannot be thought
not to exist is greater than a thing which can
be thought not to exist.
¨
(Contemporary translation: Necessary
existence is a great-making property.)
·
(ii) So if that than which nothing
greater can be thought could be thought not to exist, it would not be that than
which a greater cannot be thought (I could think of something with the same
characteristics plus the property of not being able to be thought of as not
existing) – a contradiction.
¨
(Contemporary translation: Something
is greater if it has necessary existence than if it has contingent existence.)
·
So,
that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be thought not to exist.
If it can be thought at all, then, it must exist.
(Underlying principle: necessary existence is a perfection, a
great-making property. Ditto above)
Ø
Conclusion:
That than which nothing greater can be thought exists in reality & the
understanding (1, 2, modus ponens).
GAUNILO’S CHALLENGES
TO PREMISE #1
v “I
Can Understand False Things” In
the strict sense of “understanding”, understanding (like knowledge) is
factive—one can only understand something that is true. In a looser sense of “understanding”, one can
understand false things. If Anselm means
that TNG exists in the understanding in the strict sense, then one can’t affirm
premise 1 unless it is already established that TNG exists in reality. If Anselm means that TNG exists in the
understanding in the looser sense, then TNG may or may not exist in reality
(since one can understand false things in this looser sense).
§ This objection shows Gaunilo’s insecurity
with the MindàReality move. Gaunilo wants it established that TNG exists
in the mind in such a way that it corresponds to “genuine knowledge that it
exists.” This is what Gaunilo takes understanding to be in the strict
sense. This conception of understanding
(or existing in the mind) is the foundation of the majority of Gaunilo’s
objections.
§ In short, Gaunilo doesn’t think we can be
sure whether TNG exists in the understanding until we first know that it exists
in reality. Perhaps this is because he
can only make sense of the mind-to-reality jump if Anselm’s argument uses the
strict sense of understanding.
Ø Anselm’s
reply (42-43): At this point I was merely trying to
show that TNG can exist in the understanding in some way or another (not in the strict sense). The rest of my argument will show that it
must also exist in reality.
§ Gaunilo seems to assume that Anselm is
using the strict sense of understanding in premise 1. Perhaps this is because he can’t make sense
of the understanding-to-reality transition in any other way. But premise 1 of Anselm’s argument uses the
looser sense of understanding so Gaunilo’s objection is off-base.
§ Anselm’s position is that TNG can exist
in the mind prior to any sort of
“genuine knowledge that it exists.” The
existence of TNG in the understanding is merely supposed to establish the possibility of TNG.
v *“I
Can’t Understand God” Since God is so utterly unique, I cannot actually
form an idea of him from other things I am acquainted with. I can only think of
him on the basis of the words signifying him.
That is, I hear the words ‘that than which nothing greater can be
thought’ and I have a general sense of how the words impress me, but I have no further
understanding of what these words mean than this.
Ø The main thrust of Gaunilo’s objection
here is that TNG doesn’t exist in the understanding, even in the looser sense.
Ø Anselm’s
reply: First, (p. 36)
Anselm questions the sincerity of the objection. If one is really honest with oneself, then
one will admit that they have some understanding of TNG. Second (p. 44-5), we can infer greater goods
from lesser goods; hence we can gain some understanding of TNG, or God, by
extrapolating from the good things around us.
Third, we must have at least some understanding
of TNG because we are talking about it and we understand what is being
said. Don’t let the fact that our
understanding of TNG is incomplete trip you up.
We need not have a complete understanding of something in order for it
to exist in our understanding. Who would
say that “someone who cannot gaze directly upon the purest light of the sun does
not see the light of day?” (38)
GAUNILO’S CHALLENGES
TO PREMISE #2
v “Greater
than everything else" Instead
of “that than which nothing greater can be thought,” (TNG) Gaunilo uses the
phrase “that which is greater than everything else” (GE). Now there are two senses in which we might
interpret GE. One, we might interpret it
as saying “that which, if it were to exist in reality, would be greater than
everything else.” Two, we might
interpret it as saying “that which, in actuality, is greater than everything
else.” If we accept the first
interpretation, then the transition from understanding-to-reality fails, GE
might refer to something that exists only in the understanding. But if we accept the second interpretation,
then we are right back to Gaunilo’s first objection—that is, we can’t affirm
that GE exists in the understanding until it is already established that it
exists in actuality.
§ Key quotes: “greater than everything else” & “greater
than any real thing”
Ø Anselm’s
reply (esp. p. 41): He chastises
Gaunilo’s misinterpretation of argument. “Greater than everything else (GE)” ≠ TNG.
§ “the
two don’t have the same forcing in proving that the thing spoken of exists in
reality”
§ To affirm that TNG exists in the
understanding, one need not make any claim as to its existence in reality. The same is not true for the second
interpretation of GE, which includes the claim that GE actually exists. Furthermore, on the first interpretation of
GE, the referent is something that can be thought of as existing or not
existing. But since this is the case, GE
cannot refer to the same thing that TNG refers to, since TNG is something that
cannot be thought of as not existing. So
on either interpretation of GE, GE is not equivalent to TNG. Thus, Gaunilo’s problems with GE don’t have
the same force against TNG.
v *“Lost
Island” I can give a parallel proof for an island greater than any other,
which is absurd.
·
Most
interpret this as attempting to show Anselm “proves too much”
·
Gaunilo
uses it as an example of why you must prove the existence of TNG first
§ Key quote: “you
cannot doubt this island, Greater than all others on earth, truly exists in reality”
·
Indicates
Gaunilo is using “greater than everything else” (GE) not “that than which no
greater can be thought” (TNG).
Ø Anselm’s
reply (39 & 41-2): His reply is rather dismissive,
perhaps because Gaunilo does not describe this island as a “greater than which
cannot be conceived” but only “as greater than all others”– which Anselm
criticizes him for (pp. 41-2).
§ “the
two don’t have the same force in proving that the thing spoken of exists in
reality”
·
(i.e. the argument only works for TNG,
not for Islands) X could be >
than everything else, but not a necessary being.
v “Can’t Think of Myself as Not Existing” I know with absolute certainty that I
exist, and so cannot think myself as not existing. So God is not the only being
I cannot think of as not existing.
Ø Anselm’s
reply: There are two
kinds of “thinking,” judging and imagining (read: epistemic possibility
vs. metaphysical/logical possibility). I cannot think myself as not existing in
the first sense, but I can in the second sense (but not God).
DOES GAUNILO
OR ANSELM PREVAIL?
In my mind,
there’s no unconditional winner. I’ll
explain below.
v
First,
many of Gaunilo’s objections rest on his contention that one cannot affirm
premise 1—that TNG exists in the understanding—without first establishing that
TNG exists in reality. But Gaunilo is
wrong on this point. One merely needs to
recognize the possibility of TNG to
affirm premise 1. And though the
possibility of TNG entails the existence of TNG in reality, this is the same
for all deductive arguments. Given
Gaunilo’s error here, most of his objections fall flat.
v
Second, most of Gaunilo’s other objections,
including his famous island objection, don’t work because he develops them using
“that which is greater than everything else” rather than “that than which
nothing greater can be thought.” Now if
he had developed these objections, specifically the island objection, with the
proper language, then it’s a different ballgame. Ultimately I think that objection probably
still fails but it requires a lot more analysis.
v
The
one objection that keeps this from being a full victory for Anselm is Gaunilo’s
contention that TNG does not exist in the understanding. In contemporary debates, this is basically
the objection that God is not possible or at least that it’s not clear whether
God is possible. Now in my mind, God is
clearly possible, but I’m not sure whether Anselm’s arguments are compelling
enough to firmly establish that everyone,
even the fool, must believe that God is possible. (I reserve the right to revise my claims here
as I haven’t thought through them as much as I should. It’s late and I’m tired. At the moment, this all strikes me as most
plausible though.)
v
Of
course, Anselm’s arguments may be vulnerable to other objections, but this
question is about Anselm vs. Gaunilo, not Anselm vs. truth.
SCOTUS’S
SUGGESTIONS
Found in discussion of divine infinity.
Suggests Anselm’s Argument can be “touched up.”
(No
detectibly contradiction between being and infinite by intelligence.)
v
REFINEMENT
Ø This involves adding “without a
contradiction” to God
§
(“God
is a being conceived w/out a contradiction, who is so great that it would be a
contradiction if a greater being could be conceived”)
Ø Contradictions are “inconceivable”, thus
for God to be conceivable he must be w/out a contradiction
§
Helps
to emphasize that understanding TNG is about possibility. Also, TNG does
not exist in the mind like “false things”.
These contradictions, for Scotus, like “man is irrational” are
inconceivable. ]
v
It
follows the greatest object conceivable w/out a contradiction can actually
exist in reality.
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