53. Based on the
readings available to you from The
Essential Plotinus, discuss the relationship between One, Nous, soul,
and matter.
[AT note: Outline from Chris Tweedt 2011, but I added
numbers. Below, I give an
alternative outline based on Kenny on Plotinus.]
Preface: From
highest to lowest ontologically is One, Nous, Soul, then matter. Each one
necessarily emanates the next lowest (iff there is one). I will address each
one, discussing its relationship to the others. In the end, it should be clear
what their relationships are.
Analogy
Intelligence/Being
: Artist
Soul
: Artist’s idea
Matter
: Raw material
Ensouled
thing : product
1. One/Good
a.
Highest: causes of unity are higher than the
things they cause to be unified.
b.
One ≠ Being
i. Being
are composite. One is unified
ii. Being
includes all (diverse) beings. One does not. (75,76)
iii. Being/Intelligence
thinks itself, so there’s a duality. Not for One. (76, 82)
c.
One ≠ all things
i. If
it were, it would be all things together or individually. If together, it’d be
posterior. If individually, it wouldn’t be their source. So, it’s prior. If
prior, not identical. (173)
ii. If
identical with all things, there would be no diversity. But there is. (173)
2. Nous/Being
a.
Second-highest
i. Necessarily
emanates from the One. (98, 99)
1.
“What is perfect becomes productive.”
2.
“It begets necessarily because it is perfect…”
ii. The
One only produces the greatest things that are less than it. (98)
b.
Nous = Being
i. The
act of Being/Intelligence is pure act, so undistinguishable acts. (53)
ii. Interdependence:
Intelligence gives existence to Being by thinking it. Being, by being an object
of thought, gives Intelligence its thinking and so existence. (95)
c.
Nous = All intelligences
i. As
a genus is to a species (51)
ii. It
knows them and it only knows itself (it is pure act). (50)
d.
Function
i. To
itself: intellection (65)
3. Soul
a.
Third-highest
i. Intelligence
produces Soul just as One produces Intelligence. (98)
b.
Soul ≠ Being/Nous
i. Soul
is potentially combined with matter. Being/Nous is pure act.
c.
Soul ≠ One
i. Soul
gives things qualities it is itself not. One does not. (74)
ii. Soul
is not unified because it has many diverse faculties. (74)
d.
Soul = All souls
i. As
a genus to a species (65)
ii. They
all have the same essence (65)
iii. Analogy:
Soul : sunlight :: individual souls : rays (131)
e.
Soul ≠ a particular soul
i. An
individual soul is like the sunlight marked off (131) by either:
1.
Being embodied (134, 143) or
2.
Having mental operations carried over from
previous embodiments. (134, 143)
f.
Functions (65)
i. To
Intelligence: intellection
ii. To
itself: preservation
iii. To
matter: administration
4. Matter
a.
Souls unite with matter.
b.
Why would soul unite with this?
i. Soul
contains all possible grades of souls. Matter is necessary to make some souls
less noble. (65,68)
ii. Souls
want independence from Soul. (66)
iii. Souls
want to govern. (67)
c.
Nature of the uniting
i. A
soul isn’t put into a body. A body is put into Soul. (150)
ii. The
soul isn’t contained in a body. The soul does the containing. (148)
iii. Sensation
and memory are in the soul. The soul uses body for sensing. (154, 155)
[AT note: I thought that Anthony Kenny had quick and helpful
guide to Plotinus (in An Illustrated
Brief History of Western Philosophy, pp. 106-7). His explanation follows the upward path (as opposed to, e.g.
Copleston and the outline above), i.e. from matter to One, and is helpful for
understanding why each higher level is necessary for the one below it. It also relates Plotinus to Aristotle,
Plato, and Parmenides. So here is
an outline of Kenny’s outline.]
1. Matter
a.
“Plotinus takes as his starting point Platonic
and Aristotelian arguments […].
The ultimate substratum of change, Aristotle had argued, must be something
which, of itself, possesses none of the properties of the changeable bodies we
see and handle.
b.
But a matter which possess no material
properties, Plotinus argued, is inconceivable, like the Unbeing of Parmenides.
c.
We must dispense, therefore, with Aristotelian
matter; we are left with Aristotelian forms. The most important of these was the soul […]”
2. Soul
a.
“It is natural for us to think that there are as
many souls as there are individual people. But here Plotinus appeals to another Aristotelian thesis:
the principle that forms are individuated by matter. […]
b.
So we conclude that there is only one single soul.”
c.
Soul (transcendent, incorporeal) is not bodies
(individual, corruptible, composite).
Rather: body is in soul (“by depending on it for its organization and
continued existence”).
d.
So soul governs and orders the world of bodies.
e.
“But the wisdom which it exercises in the
governance of the world is not native to it: it must come from outside. It cannot come from the material world,
since that is what it shapes; it must come from something which is by nature lnked
to the Ideas which are the models or patterns for intelligent activity. This can only be the World-Mind
[…]
3. World-Mind (Nous)
a.
Nous “both constitutes and is constituted by the
Ideas, which are the objects of its thought.
b.
In all thinking, Plotinus continues, there must
be a distinction between the thinker and what he is thinking of […]. Moreover, the Ideas which are the
objects of Mind are many in number.
In more than one way, then, Mind contains multiplicity and is therefore
composite. Like many other ancient
philosophers, Plotinus accepted as a principle that whatever was composite must
depend on something more simple.
And thus we reach, at the end of our journey upward from formless
matter, the one and only One.”
4. One
a.
“We cannot, strictly, utter any true sentences
about the One, because the use of a subject distinct from a predicate would
imply division and plurality. In a
way which remains mysterious, The One is identical with the Platonic Idea of
the Good. As The One, it is the
basis of all reality; as The Good, it is the standard of all value; but it is
itself beyond being and beyond goodness.”
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