Q48: At the beginning of his Politics Aristotle claims that “the city is among the things that exist by nature, that a human being is by nature a political animal, and that anyone who is cityless by nature and not by chance is either of a depraved sort or better than a human being” (1253a). Consider this view of the political nature of human beings in the light of Plato’s exploration of the tensions that emerge between the philosopher and the polis.

48. At the beginning of his Politics Aristotle claims that “the city is among the things that exist by nature, that a human being is by nature a political animal, and that anyone who is cityless by nature and not by chance is either of a depraved sort or better than a human being” (1253a). Consider this view of the political nature of human beings in the light of Plato’s exploration of the tensions that emerge between the philosopher and the polis.

[AT note: What follows is a mash-up of Karl Aho 2011 and “the old outline”.]

1.   Aristotle

a. The city is the natural unity of human community because it’s the smallest self-sufficient unit

b. Man is a political animal. (Otherwise why would we have speech?)

                               i.     Argument: Nature makes nothing pointlessly. Humans have speech. Speech is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, just and unjust.  So, nature made humans to be able to investigate what is just and unjust. What is made by nature to investigate what is just and unjust is by nature most a political animal.

c. Man needs the city to be happy and live well, in community, as a human (not through participation)

                               i.     There is no leisure without the city.  The city it provides the leisure necessary for becoming a philosopher.

d. The city educates (its laws and education are geared to produce virtuous people), and education is necessary for happiness. (c.f. NE I & X)

e. His vision is for this life, not the life to come

f. Some virtues (justice, generosity), as well as the political life, require the city.

2.   Plato

(arguably) thinks that the city exists for the sake of the soul

a. in the Republic:

                               i.     the philosopher must be compelled to lead the city instead of merely contemplating the forms.

                              ii.     The myth of Er suggests that living well will be rewarded, but there is no corresponding promise of reward for the city. (The myth of Er suggests that moral people are rewarded and immoral people punished after death.  Er is the name of a guy who died in battle but came back to life to tell the tale.) (So, there’s a focus on not this life.)

                            iii.     And it’s unclear whether the Republic is a political text at all, i.e. whether Plato thought that people could or should build an ideal Platonic city.  The philosopher might need a city, but it needn’t be a political city.  The city of artisans would work just fine.  We don’t need the city to educate, except incidentally.

                            iv.     Finally, the life of contemplation is the only really happy life for Plato.  The political life isn’t really an option.

1.   Plato does not think that man is a political animal.  In fact, he thinks that the political life is getting in the way because it requires us to interact with other people.

                              v.     NOTE:  It’s less clear that Platonic virtues require others in the way that Aristotle’s do, although other Platonic dialogues (that we don’t read, like the Gorgias and the Statesman) do address the political life.

                            vi.     In Plato’s city, you don’t educate everyone (in contrast with Aristotle); e.g. you tell the myth of the metals.  Education is important for the existence of the city (to make sure there are philosopher rulers), but the city doesn’t have a built-in educational system.

                           vii.     Agrees there is not leisure without the city - There is a sense in which Plato would have to agree that the city provides the setting that makes philosophy possible. The democratic regime is in fact the only regime besides the ideal regime in which philosophy can be practiced. He needs a city in which he does not have to participate in the offices.

b. in the Phaedo:

                               i.     Plato emphasizes philosophy as preparation for death and the afterlife rather than for living well.

                              ii.     The Phaedo and Republic suggest that the happy life is one separated from the body.

Q43: Describe Aristotle’s account of the relation between potentiality and actuality, on the one hand, and matter and form, on the other hand. From Aristotle’s views about these two sets of paired concepts, what implications follow for the nature of the prime mover as discussed in Metaphysics XII (Lambda)?

43. Describe Aristotle’s account of the relation between potentiality and actuality, on the one hand, and matter and form, on the other hand. From Aristotle’s views about these two sets of paired concepts, what implications follow for the nature of the prime mover as discussed in Metaphysics XII (Lambda)?

1.   Matter and form

a. Matter is the stuff out of which a thing is made.

                                               i.     e.g. In a statue of David, the matter is the clay.

b. Form is the way that stuff’s arranged.

                                               i.     e.g. In a statue of David, it’s the shape of the statue.

2.   Actuality and Potentiality

a. Actuality is that by which something that is able to be something is that something

b. Potentiality is the capacity to undergo a change of some kind, to become something

3.   Comparison

a. actuality : potentiality :: form : matter

b. When you look at the distinction between matter and form synchronically, you see matter and form.  When you look at the same distinction diachronically, you see potentiality and actuality.

c. Actuality is to potentiality as that which has been shaped out of some matter (e.g. a table) is to the matter out of which it has been shaped (e.g. wood)

4.   Priority of Act to Potency

a. Actuality is prior to potentiality in logos, time, and substance.

                                               i.     Logos – because we must cite the actuality whenever we talk of the potentiality. (e.g. ‘visible’ means ‘capable of being seen’)

                                             ii.     Time – “The actual which is identical in species but not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it” (1049b18-19)  (e.g. some actual oak tree is prior to this acorn, i.e. to this potential oak tree.)

                                            iii.     Substance –

1.   Form or actuality is the end towards which natural processes are directed (boy becomes a man, e.g.)

2.   More strictly:

a.     A potentiality is for either of a pair of opposites; so anything capable of being is capable of not being.  What is capable of not being is perishable.  So anything with the mere potential to be is perishable.

b.     What is eternal is imperishable.  So something eternal cannot exist potentially.  What is eternal must be fully actual.

c.     The eternal exists only actually, and the perishable exists potentially. The eternal is prior to the perishable because the former can exist without the latter but not the other way around.  So actuality is prior to potency.

5.   How the above pertains to the Prime Mover:

a. The prime mover functions to explain motion, and motion is explained in terms of actuality and potency.

                                               i.     “The actuality of what is F potentially, insofar as it is F potentially, is motion.”

b. Characteristics of the prime mover:

                                               i.     ETERNAL

1.   Motion is eternal and so its cause must be eternal

2.   Why motion must be eternal: If motion at one time was not then came to be, then the mover and the moved must have at one time been in a state where the mover was not moving the moved, and altered out of that state.  But that would have required some motion within the mover or the moved. And so on, ad infinitum.

                                             ii.     UNMOVABLE

1.   If the prime mover were moveable, then there would have to be something else that causes its motion, etc.  Infinite regress.

                                            iii.     PURE ACTUALITY -- If it weren’t pure actuality, it wouldn’t be eternal.

                                            iv.     PURE FORM -- If it had any matter in it, it would be part potentiality. 

                                             v.     NECESSARY -- If not, then part potentiality.

                                            vi.     SPIRITUAL -- Has no matter, so not material.  Therefore, spiritual.

                                          vii.     INTELLECTUAL

1.   The Prime Mover cannot perform any bodily action.  Rather, its activity must be purely spiritual and therefore intellectual.

2.   The object of its thought must be (a) the best possible object (b/c the prime mover is the best) and (b) unchanging (because otherwise, the Prime Mover would change when the object of its thought changed).  So the object of its thought is itself.

                                         viii.     How it moves the universe:

1.     By being the final cause of the first moved movers.

Possibly helpful secondary source quotes:

“[T]hat which is eternal is prior in substance to that which is perishable; and that which is eternal, imperishable, is in the highest sense actual.  God, for example, exists necessarily, and that which exists necessarily must be fully actual: as the eternal Source of movement, of the reduction of potentiality to act, God must be full and complete actuality, the Unmoved First Mover.  Eternal things, says Aristotle, must be good: there can be in them no defect or badness or perversion. […] The First Unmoved Mover, being the source of all movement, as final cause, is the ultimate cause why potentiality is actualized, i.e. why goodness is realized.” – Copleston (pg. 53 in 1962 ed.)

“Every motion, every transit from potentiality to act, requires some principle in act, but if every becoming, every object in movement, requires an actual moving cause, then the world in general, the universe, requires a First Mover. [“First” meaning “supreme” not temporally first.] The First Mover is the eternal source of eternal motion.  Moreover, the First Mover is not a Creator-God: the world existed from al eternity without having been created from all eternity.  God forms the world, but did not create it, and He forms the world, is the source of motion, by drawing it, i.e. by acting as final cause.  In Aristotle’s view, if God cuased motion by efficient physical causation – “shoving” the world, as it were – then He Himself would be changed: there would be a reaction of the moved on the mover.  He must act, therefore, as Final Cause, by being an object of desire.” – Copleston (pp. 56-7 in 1962 ed.)

Q38: Compare Plato’s account of the soul’s powers in Republic 4 with Aristotle’s account of them in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13. [New in 2011:] What are the strengths and weaknesses of each account and which do you find more compelling overall?

38. Compare Plato’s account of the soul’s powers in Republic 4 with Aristotle’s account of them in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13. [New in 2011:] What are the strengths and weaknesses of each account and which do you find more compelling overall?

1.   Plato

a. appetitive, spirited, rational

                                               i.     appetite: the part of the soul that desires food, sex, money, etc.

                                             ii.     spirit: the part of the soul that desires things like honor and winning.

                                            iii.     rational: the part of the soul that reflects

b. Basis for distinction:

                                               i.     the principle of non-contrariety: if X and Y are contrary relations, nothing can unqualifiedly stand in X and Y to the same thing; and desire and aversion are contrary relations.  So simultaneous desire and aversion indicates that there are different things (in this case, soul parts) that have those relations.

                                             ii.     Appetitive and reasonable are different: Appetite and reason can act in contrary ways, such when thirsting to drink (appetite) and knowing one should not drink (reason).  btw, appetite is fundamentally irrational and must be subdued by reason.

                                            iii.     Spirited and appetitive are different: The spirited part has desires contrary to the appetitive, like when Leontius was angry at his (appetitive) desire to look at the dead bodies down by the Piraeus.

                                            iv.     Spirited and appetitive are different from rational: The rational part is not emotional.

c. Division is reflected in parts of a city:

                                               i.     Ruling: rational

                                             ii.     Guardians: spirited

                                            iii.     Other citizens: appetitive

2.   Aristotle

a. vegetative, appetitive/sensitive, rational

                                               i.     vegetative: responsible for nourishment and growth; irrelevant to ethics

                                             ii.     appetitive: responsible for desires and passion; corresponds to Plato’s appetitive & spirited; is under the control of reason; is the seat of the moral virtues

                                            iii.     rational: is the seat of the intellectual virtues

b. Basis for distinction:

                                               i.     functional: they all have different functions (see above), so they’re all different parts.

                                             ii.     Vegetative and rational are different: the vegetative part is working even when a man is sleeping and the rational part isn’t working.  Humans are alive when they sleep, and thus have a soul in act, but they aren’t reasoning, and so reason is not in act.

                                            iii.     Vegetative and appetitive are different: this part perceives sensible, particular forms.  It desires.  Unlike the vegetative part, it participates in reason, can be persuaded by it.

                                            iv.     Rational and the others are different: the rational part perceives intellectual, universal forms.  It is guided by the intellectual virtues.

c. Division reflected in the genre of living things.

                                               i.     Humans: rational

                                             ii.     Animals: sensitive

                                            iii.     Plants: vegetative

3.   Strengths and Weaknesses - Possibilities

                                               i.     It depends on what you’re trying to do.  Aristotle’s division is really good if you’re trying to do virtue ethics b/c the division of the soul matches the kind-division of virtues.  But Plato’s is good for…? Illustrating that justice is the three parts existing harmoniously and is thus in the interest of ones who have it?

                                             ii.     Plato’s basis for distinction is not great.  The principle of non-contrariety is only true for Plato’s forms.