Monday, July 16, 2012

Q.6 - How does Gorgias deconstruct Parmenides’ understanding of Being?


Q. 6- How does Gorgias deconstruct Parmenides’ understanding of Being?

I.               Parmenides – being is complete, motionless and one.
a.     Argument for one.
                                               i.     If being is not one, then beings differ.
                                             ii.     If beings differ, then they either differ by being or by not being.
                                            iii.     Things cannot differ by being because this is not to differ at all.
                                            iv.     Things cannot differ by being because this is what they have in common.
                                              v.     So, beings do not differ.
b.     Without difference the one is complete.
c.      If complete, no motion.
                                               i.     Motion requires going from non-being to being.

II.             Gorgias’ deconstruction.
a.     Argument that nothing is:
                                               i.     If something is, either (A) what-is is, (B) what-is-not is or, (C) both (A) and (B).
                                             ii.     Not (B), for what-is-not is not.
                                            iii.     So not (C) (requires (B))
                                            iv.     Not (A).
1.     If (A) what-is is, then it is either eternal, generated, or both at once.
2.     Not eternal.
a.     If eternal, then no beginning.
b.     If no beginning, then unlimited.
c.      If unlimited, then nowhere.
                                                                                                     i.     Being somewhere requires being circumscribed by what it is in, which is a limit.
d.     If nowhere, then it is not.
3.     Not generated.
a.     If generated, then either from a thing that is or a thing that is not.
b.     Not from a thing that is.
                                                                                                     i.     If it is, then it already is and has not come to be. [completeness]
c.      Not from what is not.
                                                                                                     i.     What is not cannot generate anything, for what generates must share in existence.
4.     Not both, for they exclude each other.
                                              v.     So, nothing is.
b.     Argument that nothing is knowable, even if it is.
                                               i.     If things that are thought of are not things that are, then what-is is not thought of.
                                             ii.     Things that are thought of are not things that are.
1.     If things that are thought of are things that are, then things tare are not will not be thought of.
a.     Opposites have opposite attributes.
b.     What-is-not is opposite to what-is.
2.     But things that are not are thought of.
c.      Even if what-is can be comprehended, it cannot be communicated to another individual.
                                               i.     We communicate by logos, but logos is not the object.
                                             ii.     We can only communicate the logos to one another, not the object itself.


III.           How this undermines Parmenides
a.     Using a Parmenidean like dialectic of being and non-being, Gorgias concludes that nothing exists and that being cannot be known or communicated.
b.     G concludes a contradiction to Parm’s conclusion using Parm’s understanding of being as complete, motionless and one.
c.  Thus undermining Parm’s method and argument.

Q.1 : Describe the concept of the arche. How does this concept change from Thales to Anaximines to Anaximander?


  1. Describe the concept of the arche. How does this concept change from Thales to Anaximines to Anaximander?

I.               Arche.
a.     Beginning, first principle, that which is prior.
b.     To Thales, to Anaximander and Anaximines this was an underlying thing, material cause: stuff things are made out of.
c.      The arche is the unifying principle of the many.
d.     How Aristotle characterizes their understanding of the arche:
                                               i.     Of those who first pursued philosophy, the majority believed that the only principles of all things are principles in the form of matter. For that of which all existing things are composted and that from which they originally come to be and that into which they finally perish—the substance persisting but changing in its attributes—this they state is the element and principle of the things that are. (Metaphysics, 1.3)
II.             Thales: Water.
a.     One thing clear about Thales – Water is the arche.
                                               i.     T said the earth rests on water.
                                             ii.     T said all things full of gods – meaning unclear.
                                            iii.     But testimony from Aristotle is clear that water is the principle.
                                            iv.     Copleston:
1.     The only certain and the only really important point about Thales’ doctrine is that he conceived “things”: as varying forms of one primary and ultimate element.
b.     Aristotle thought Thales water was a material principle/cause.
                                               i.     Aristotle conjectures that Thales’ reasons could have been
1.     “Nourishment, heat, and living organisms are observed to come from moist things, and water is the origin of the moist.”
2.     And that seeds – the origins of things – require moisture.
c.      So, in Thales we have the first philosophical attempt to identify the unifying principle of things.

III.           Anaximander: boundless, indefinite, unlimited (apeiron)
a.     Arguments that the arche is apeiron.
                                               i.     Origin must be boundless.
1.     Generation and decay will never stop.
a.     Anaximander held that motion – generation and decay – is eternal.
2.     If generation and decay have a bounded origin, then they will stop.
3.     So, generation and decay have a boundless origin.
                                             ii.     Boundless is not a contrary. (arguments  from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximan/ )
1.     If the boundless origin was one of the contraries, e.g., moist-dry, hot-cold, it would have long since destroyed its contrary.
2.     The contraries are not destroyed.
3.     So the boundless is not one of the contraries.
4.     Against Thales: the boundless is not water, because then there would be no dryness.
b.     So, the boundless acts similarly like Thales’ water insofar as it is the unifying arche, but can explain the existence of contraries and eternality of motion.

IV.           Anaximines: aēr (usually translated “air” but more like a dense mist than what we think of as air, which is ideally transparent.
a.     Air is the arche.
                                               i.     “As our soul, being air, keeps us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole cosmos.” (Fr. 2)
b.     Offers explanation of how all things come from air:
                                               i.     Air is always in motion
                                             ii.     Changes through condensation and rarefaction.
1.     Rarefaction – gets finer and becomes fire.
2.     Condensation – gets denser and becomes wind-cloud-water-stone.
c.      Comparison to Thales and Anaximander:
                                               i.     Like Thales and Anaximander: air operates as a unifying principle/ arche.
                                             ii.     Like Anaximander: underlying nature is one and unlimited.
                                            iii.     Between Thales and Anaximander:
1.     Air is less definite than water, allowing for contraries.
2.     Air is more definite than apeiron, providing needed unity.

Thursday, June 28, 2012

Blake's Aristotle, After Aristotle, and Augustine and Boethius Questions

I've completed my outlines for these sections.  If you would like to have them before our set date in July, just send me a quick email and I'll send them your way.

Best,
Blake