Q44 ~ How do Aristotle’s judgments about the nature of the human soul relate to his judgment that the contemplative life constitutes the highest form of human flourishing?

44.  How do Aristotle’s judgments about the nature of the human soul relate to his judgment that the contemplative life constitutes the highest form of human flourishing?

RW: Karl’s (=Nate Jackson’s) outline is pretty strong, but not entirely clear.  A few content changes, cleaned up the formatting, intro added.

I)     Intro

A)   Set-up

1)    The context in NE

B)    Overview

1)    Flourishing/happiness consists in fulfilling one’s function well.  For humans, this is virtuous activity of the rational part of the soul.  The highest form of flourishing requires the highest virtue, and theoretical wisdom is the highest form of virtue.  Thus, the contemplative life is the most characteristically human, continuous, pleasing, self-sufficient, inherently choice-worthy, godlike life. 

C)    Map

1)    Flourishing, function, and virtue

2)    The elements of the human soul

3)    Virtue and the soul

4)    Contemplation and flourishing

II)   Flourishing, Function, and Virtue

A)   If a being has a function, its good/flourishing depends on that function

1)    Humans have a function, so their good/flourishing depends on it

2)    The human function: activity of the part of the soul that has reason (1098a)

3)    Thus, the human good: “the soul’s activity that expresses virtue.” (1098a)

(a)   This end is complete, self-sufficient, and choice-worthy for its own sake

B)    This account of flourishing suggests we need to understand the soul and virtue (next two sections)

III) The Elements of the Soul

A)   Aristotle’s account in NE is quick and dirty

1)    He’s given a fuller account elsewhere

2)    He isn’t concerned with questions of the separability of the parts

B)    Non-rational part

1)    Nutrition and growth (not distinctive of humans)

2)    Sense-perception (not distinctive: shared with other animals)

C)    Rational part

1)    The rational part has two parts

(a)   One part has reason and thinking in itself

(b)   One part [the part related to impulse, appetite, desire] is responsive to the reason in the other part

(i)    This part is mentioned at I.vii and I.xiii

(ii)  It turns up in discussion of (in)continence vs. (in)temperance

(iii) In one sense, this part is nonrational; in another, rational

(i)    If the impulse-driven part of the soul can be said to posses reason, it is reason in the sense that one listens to good advice; it does not have reason or knowledge itself, but is ready to listen to it

2)    The rational part of the soul is the distinctive function of humans

3)    So human flourishing consists in virtuous activity of the rational soul

IV) Virtue and the Soul

A)   Virtue defined: see Q#52

B)    The division of human virtue corresponds with the parts of the soul

1)    Character virtue

(a)   The appetitive part that listens to reason:

(b)   Arise through habituation

2)    Intellectual virtue

(a)   The purely rational part

(b)   Arise through learning (II.i)

C)    The five intellectual virtues may be divided according to faculties of the rational part of the soul (Copleston, 343ff)

1)    Calculative faculty: concerned with contingent objects

(a)   Techne (craft): “the disposition by which we make things by the aid of a true rule”

(b)   Phronesis (practical wisdom): “a true disposition towards action, by the aid of a rule, with regard to things good or bad for men.”  Concerned with the practical syllogism.

2)    Scientific faculty: concerned with necessary objects

(a)   Episteme (scientific knowledge): “the disposition by virtue of which we demonstrate [i.e., prove]”

(b)   Nous (understanding): “intuitive reason, whereby we grasp a universal truth after experience of a certain number of particular instances and then see this truth or principle to be self-evident.”

(c)   Sophia (theoretical wisdom): the combination of episteme and nous, directed to the highest objects (=the objects of metaphysics, and also (probably) math and natural science, insofar as those are not contingent)

(i)    Knowledge is dignified by its object

(ii)  The objects of sophia are the highest objects

(iii) Thus, the contemplation of such things = the ideal human life

V)    Contemplation and Flourishing

A)   Three potential ways of life

1)    Life of pleasure: ruled out as vulgar

2)    Political life: happy in a secondary way

(a)   It involves the character virtues and the exercise of reason, thus the development of the intellectual virtues mentioned in book VI. However, it lacks the full development of the understanding and the full exercise of wisdom

3)    Contemplative life: the ideal life

(a)   Highest Virtue: Flourishing/Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue

(i)    Our highest flourishing is in accordance with our highest virtue, which is the virtue of the best element

(ii)  “Reason is the highest faculty of man, and theoretic contemplation is the highest activity of reason.”

(b)   Continuous: “We can keep up this form of activity longer than any other, e.g., than bodily exercise.”

(c)   Pleasing: “Pleasure is one of the elements of happiness, and philosophy is admittedly the pleasantest of the activities in which human excellence manifests itself.”

(d)   Self-sufficient: “The philosopher is more self-sufficient than any other man.”  (i.e., you can study in solitude; expression of character virtue requires others to be objects of actions.)

(e)   Liked for itself: “Philosophy is loved for its own sake and not for the sake of any results that accrue from it.”

(f)   Leisure: “Happiness would seem to imply leisure.”  But practical virtues are applied in war, politics, etc., not leisure.

(g)   Divine: The contemplative life is superior to the "simply human" life, insofar as intellect is the divine element in the human, the activity of which is superior to the activity in accordance with character virtues: the god's activity is contemplation, this is blessed, so the activity of contemplation is itself happiness

(h)  It must be recognized, though, that the life of contemplation is not possible without moral virtue.

(i)    We are not meant to see the political and contemplative lives in opposition to each other. The philosopher, qua human, should have all of the same virtues as the politician. He simply has the extra virtue of wisdom.

(ii)  Further note: it must be over a complete life.