Q55 ~ Write an essay on the relation of emotion to virtue in Seneca. Draw on both On Anger and On Favors in your discussion.

55.  Write an essay on the relation of emotion to virtue in Seneca. Draw on both On Anger and On Favors in your discussion.

RW: Previous outlines had solid content.  I slightly supplemented and reorganized it into what I think is a more logical progression of thought.  Also, I included an intro and an evaluation, which aren’t strictly part of the question, and which account for the length.  J 

I)     Intro

A)   Setup

1)    Seneca as a third stage Roman Stoic

B)    Overview

1)    Seneca has a judgment theory of emotion, according to which all emotions are voluntary false judgments for which we are responsible.  The virtuous person will eliminate emotion through reason, though she will have proto-emotions and characteristic good feelings.  The view is illustrated through anger and favors.

C)    Map

1)    Seneca’s Stoic worldview

2)    Seneca’s judgment theory of emotion

3)    Emotion and virtue in Seneca

(a)   There are no virtuous emotions

(i)    On Anger

(b)   There are virtuous non-emotional affective states

(i)    On Favors

4)    [Concluding Evaluation]

II)   Seneca’s Stoic worldview

A)   The order of the world

1)    The world is a rational animal.  God/logos is the world soul.

2)    God/logos is in control, so all that happens naturally is ultimately good.

B)    Psychological monism

1)    Contra Plato, the soul is one (not tripartite), and it is rational.

(a)   There is some controversy here, as Seneca spends a lot of time talking about the will, which seems to be a different capacity than reason

2)    Our rationality closely ties us to God/logos, and grounds our solidarity with God and other humans.

C)    Reason and virtue

1)    Given psychological monism and the close tie between us and God/logos, our ultimate good/aim is to live in accordance with nature (i.e., God/logos).

2)    Thus, virtue consists in developing/using our rational capacity, regardless of what our external circumstances may be.

III) Seneca’s judgment theory of emotion

A)   Emotions are voluntary rational judgments

1)    Seneca, with Plato and Aristotle, sees emotions as evaluative responses to some significant event in our lives.

2)    Against Plato and Aristotle, Seneca sees these responses as rational judgments.

(a)   This difference is rooted in Seneca’s psychological monism

3)    These rational judgments are voluntary

(a)   There are two movements associated with emotion

(i)    Movement 1: Involuntary bodily agitation (cannot be overcome by reason)

(ii)  Movement 2: Voluntary rational judgment (eliminable by decision)

(i)    First, one judges that it would be right to do X (reason gives assent).  Emotion is not yet insistent on action.

(ii)  Then, one lusts to act on emotion, to do what it prescribes.  Emotion becomes insistent on action.

(b)   The first movement is OK (since involuntary and not eliminable); the second movement is not OK (see next section).

B)    These rational judgments are agitated and false

1)    Emotions are agitated states in response to good/bad external circumstances.

2)    Emotions misjudge reality

(a)   Stoics hold that external circumstances are not of ultimate importance, and that everything happens according to the ordering of God/logos.

(b)   Emotions regard external circumstances as more important than they are, and (in when in response to perceived evil) fail to recognize the goodness of all things.

IV) Emotion and virtue in Seneca

A)   There are no virtuous emotions

1)    Since virtue consists in conformity with reason, and emotion is irrational by definition, no emotion can be virtuous. 

2)    Also, the mental agitation characteristic of emotion is opposed to Stoic virtue (rational calm)

3)    So, eliminate emotion.

B)    Illustration: On Anger

1)    The nature of anger

(a)   Anger is a burning desire to punish him by whom you think yourself to have been unfairly harmed

(i)    The impression of having been harmed is not the emotion.

(ii)  The emotion comes when, through rational judgment, one assents to the impression, and desires to act on it.

2)    The problem with anger

(a)   Anger is a brief insanity

(b)   Anger is inhuman, small-minded and useless, ugly and dangerous (self-destructive – leads to madness)

3)    The treatment for anger

(a)   Contra Plato and Aristotle, you do NOT try to rehabilitate the emotion by trying to get it in line with reason.  This isn’t possible, says Seneca.

(b)   Rather, you eliminate the emotion through argument, strengthening and shaping the reasoning capacities which assent to the false impression anger presents

(i)    Two ways of doing this

(i)    Convince the potentially angered person that the offense does not warrant vengeance

1.     The “harm” is not the bad that anger says it is

a.     Don’t believe the worst (e.g., about the perpetrator’s intentions)

b.     Don’t be irritated by trivialities

c.     Remember, we all share in failings

d.     Don’t be surprised by anything

e.     You haven’t been wronged

i.      Inanimate objects, animals, and bad people can’t wrong us

ii.     God/logos doesn’t wrong us

iii.   The good “harm” us for our own good

2.     Retribution is not the good thing anger says it is

a.     E.g., vengeance is not pleasurable, it makes the insult burn more

(ii)  Convince the potentially angered person that anger itself is wrong

1.     Anger is hateful and ugly, harmful to others, harmful to self (a kind of insanity/refuses to be governed), etc.

C)    There are virtuous non-emotional affective states

1)    Though emotion is agitated and irrational by definition, there are non-agitated, rational affective responses (= “characteristic good feelings”) that the virtuous person can have which accompany judgment.

(a)   There are Four generic types of emotion-responses

(i)    Pleasure – emotions directed towards some perceived present good

(ii)  Pain – towards perceived present bad

(iii) Desire – future good

(iv) Fear – future bad

(b)   There are four analogous characteristic good feelings

(i)    Joy // Pleasure

(ii)  [Nothing // Pain]

(iii) Wishing // Desire

(iv) Caution // Fear

(v)  Mercy (added, not analogous to the emotion types)

2)    The Wise Man (=Stoic ideal agent) has proto-emotions and characteristic good feelings

(a)   He is subject to impressions, agitations, like everyone else is, but withholds the assent characteristic of emotion

(b)   He can have the characteristic good feelings.  He is not numb, just not emotional.

D)   Illustration: On Favors

1)    For more detail, see Q#47

2)    Favor = An act of benevolence bestowing joy and deriving joy from the bestowing of it, with an inclination and spontaneous readiness to do so.

3)    The doing of favors is a function of virtue

(a)   The Gods give favors. We must model those who are already rationally perfect.

(b)   Favors sustain the fellowship given to us by nature.

4)    The giving and receiving of favors essentially involves characteristic good feelings

(a)   Giving favors

(i)    To be done without hesitation, in the right way/place/time, not as an investment, not to extremes, etc.

(ii)  The quality of will/character/intent makes it a favor

(iii) This essentially includes wishing joy to the recipient, and deriving joy

(b)   Receiving favors

(i)    Favors are to be received cheerfully, with gratitude and joy.

5)    Thus, characteristic good feelings are a function of virtue

V)   Concluding Evaluation

A)   [This is not actually part of the question, but I thought I’d give it anyway.  J]

B)    Briefly summarize Seneca’s view

C)    Positive: There is much wisdom in his conceptual analysis and recommendations.

D)   Against judgment theory (Objections from Roberts, Emotions, 84ff.)

1)    “The propositional content of some full-fledged emotions is not assented to by the subject of the emotion.”  (E.g. phobias)

2)    “The very same judgment that is supposedly identical with an emotion is sometimes made in the absence of the emotion.”

3)    “Emotions are subject to voluntary control in a way they would not be were they judgments.”  (E.g. I can’t convince myself that I don’t judge that white piece of paper to be an orange piece of paper.   But I can calm my anger down.)

E)    Quibble with Seneca’s categories

1)    Some “characteristic good feelings” strike me as full-fledged emotions (e.g., joy)

2)    I don’t think mental agitation is a necessary condition for emotion (e.g., “cool” emotion)

F)    Virtuous anger and gratitude

1)    Given my Christian metaphysic, I think some anger (e.g., at genuine injustice) is virtuous.

2)    With Seneca, I think gratitude is virtuous; I just count it as an emotion.