Q51 ~ Explain and evaluate Aristotle’s proposed explanation of akrasia (weakness of will) in Nicomachean Ethics 7.

51.  Explain and evaluate Aristotle’s proposed explanation of akrasia (weakness of will) in Nicomachean Ethics 7.

RW: There was only one previous outline, which I used but added to (mostly based on Roberts notes) and rearranged. 

I)     Intro

A)   Set-up

1)    The context in NE

B)    Overview

1)    Aristotle is concerned both with giving an account of akrasia (and neighboring notions), as well as solving the apparent paradox of knowing the good but failing to do it.  Akrasia (=incontinence) is when someone partakes of bodily pleasure in excess because their appetites keep them from standing by their deliberation not to act in that way. (Note: their reason for so acting is NOT that they think it best to engage excessively in bodily pleasures.)  This occurs through a sort of ignorance (namely, ignorance of the minor premise in a practical syllogism).  Incontinence is incompatible with prudence.

C)    Map

1)    What is akrasia?  (Disambiguate its species, and compare/contrast related concepts)

2)    Incontinence and knowledge

3)    Incontinence and prudence

4)    Evaluation

II)   What is akrasia?

A)   Akrasia = Incontinence

1)    The incontinent are distinguished from others by their concerns (i.e., desires, appetites) and their attitudes toward their concerns (i.e., they recognize they are not right to pursue)

(a)   Lacks control/mastery over himself, specifically over his nonrational appetites

(b)   Has the correct decision, but acts on appetite instead (i.e., he thinks act X is wrong to pursue, yet still pursues it)

(c)   Roberts’ example:

(i)    Incontinence is exemplified when somebody who knows a course of action to be the best knowingly takes a bad or less good course of action instead, out of attraction to the latter. Consider the person who knows that his eudaimonia depends on his having a “happy” marriage and that this in turn depends on his being faithful to his wife. But he is tempted to have an affair with a very beautiful and interesting woman at work who repeatedly coaxes him and makes him offers. Let us say that this man is a thinking person and has a clear understanding of what makes for his eudaimonia, and he understands why having this affair will ruin it. This man would exemplify incontinence if, due to the attractions of the woman, the excitement, and the pleasure of having the affair, he forsook his eudaimonia by having the affair.

2)    = The person prone to be overcome by their appetite for pleasures

(a)   Cf. Continent = the person who overcomes his appetites (e.g., the man who overcomes his appetites and so does not have the affair described above)

(b)   Cf. Soft = the person who is overcome by pains.  (Whereas the incontinent turn from the right course because of attraction to pleasure, the soft turn aside because of repulsion from pain.  Roberts’ E.g.: the man who won’t climb a ladder to save his child from a burning building because of fear of heights)

(c)   Cf. Resistant = the person who overcomes pains (e.g., the man who climbs the ladder, despite his fear)

B)    Species of Incontinence

1)    Differences in the object of incontinence

(a)   We call some people incontinent in respect of ... (anger, honor, etc.)

(i)    This is not really incontinence, but rather an excess which should be avoided. They are called incontinent only analogically.

(b)   Simple incontinence

(i)    We call people incontinent in the unqualified sense when they are concerned with bodily enjoyments (i.e., the same subject matter as intemperance)

(ii)  Note: We do not call someone incontinent if they act so due to nature or because they are in a morbid state.

2)    Differences in deliberation

(a)   Weakness: the person deliberates, but his feelings make him abandon the result of his deliberation

(b)   Impetuosity: Led on by feelings because he has not deliberated.  E.g., quick-tempered and ardent people.

(c)   Weakness is worse than impetuosity.

C)    Compare/contrast Intemperance

1)    Concerned in a way with the same pleasures and pains, but not in the same way

(a)   The intemperate person pursues excesses of pleasure because they are excesses and because he decides on them (i.e., he thinks they are right); the intemperate person has no regrets, and so is incurable.

(b)   The incontinent doesn’t so decide; they are curable

2)    Intemperance is worse than incontinence

(a)   It is worse to act shamefully from no/weak appetite than from intense appetite

(b)   The incontinent is more easily persuaded out of bad acts

3)    Incontinence is not, strictly speaking, a vice, though it is one in a way.

(a)   Incontinence conflicts with decision; vice expresses decision

(b)   Yet it is similar to vice in action.

D)   The relative goodness/badness of the various states of character

1)    From best to worst: divine excellence, virtue, continence, resistance, incontinence, softness, vice, bestial.

III) Incontinence and Knowledge

A)   Puzzle: Some (e.g., Socrates) thought one who knows the good will do the good.

B)    Solution: We can have knowledge in two ways

1)    Dispositional knowledge: Have knowledge, without attending to it

(a)   Acting incontinently against such knowledge is not extraordinary

2)    Episodic knowledge: Have knowledge, with attending to it

(a)   Acting incontinently against such knowledge is extraordinary

C)    Need knowledge of general and particular premises (in practical syllogism)

1)    The incontinent may only know the general premise, but not the particular premise (or, perhaps more accurately, he knows the particular premise only dispositionally, though he may have known it episodically if he weren’t impeded by passions, etc.) – e.g., they may know that act-type X is bad, yet don’t realize that act A falls under that type, and so fail to act in accord with the general premise

D)   Use of knowledge can be impeded by our condition

1)    Drunkenness, strong emotions, sexual appetites, etc.

2)    Incontinent people “say the words in the way that actors do” – they don’t appreciate what they are saying.

E)    Conclusion: Incontinence reduces to (at least temporary) ignorance

1)    The incontinent person acts against knowledge by, in one of the ways just outlined, breaking the connection between their knowledge of the good and their assessment of the situation before them.

2)    But he doesn’t act against the highest form of knowledge; just the knowledge of the particular premise

IV) Incontinence and Prudence

A)   The incontinent person cannot be practically wise

1)    Practical wisdom consists of not only knowing but also acting; since the incontinent man is unable to act, he cannot be practically wise.

2)    The incontinent man can be clever, though.

3)    The incontinent man is “like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them”.

V)   Evaluation of Aristotle’s explanation

A)   Evaluate as you see fit!

B)    My evaluation (influenced by Roberts notes)

1)    Much of the conceptual analysis seems mostly right to me (e.g., helpful disambiguations)

2)    I don’t think acting against knowledge of the good is always reducible to temporary ignorance. 

(a)   Big missing piece: deficit in the will itself, even with knowledge of good.

(b)   Deficit in the will can be rooted in a deficit of concern for the good, or a deficit of effort to stay on the right path.

3)    It isn’t obvious to me that it is always easier to cure incontinence than intemperance

(a)   It seems that changing the will/appetites (which is needed for curing incontinence) can be harder in some instances than retraining moral judgments (which is needed for curing intemperance, and by which an intemperate person can come to feel regret)