Q34 ~ *What is knowledge, according to Plato? Include in your discussion the search for a definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus as well as the relevant passages in Republic and Meno. Comment on the relation of knowledge to both belief and understanding. If you think Plato’s understanding of knowledge changes between these works, you should note and substantiate this.

34.  *What is knowledge, according to Plato? Include in your discussion the search for a definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus as well as the relevant passages in Republic and Meno. Comment on the relation of knowledge to both belief and understanding.  If you think Plato’s understanding of knowledge changes between these works, you should note and substantiate this.

RW: Previous outlines were pretty good, though didn’t interact much with Republic.  I supplemented accordingly, and slightly rearranged the material.  Copleston’s chapter on Plato’s epistemology was a good resource.  Sorry for the length.  Covering such a big topic, with reference to three dialogues, takes a bit.  I even feel like I skimped in places!

I)     Intro

A)   Set-up

1)    No single, clear statement by Plato.  View of knowledge given over many dialogues, with many ambiguities (e.g., Meno and Theaetetus end in aporia).

2)    We’ll attempt to piece together his view from three dialogues

B)    Overview

1)    Knowledge is an attainable, infallible grasping of the real (i.e., the Forms), arrived at by way of recollection/dialectic, with a crucial connection to living the good life.  Knowledge is not sense perception, or true opinion, or true opinion with an account.

C)    Map

1)    Theaetetus: What knowledge is not

2)    Republic: True knowledge

3)    Meno: The acquisition of knowledge

4)    Knowledge and the good life: all three dialogues

II)   Theaetetus: What knowledge is not

A)   Ostensive definitions

1)    Here (e.g., clay) and elsewhere (e.g., bee example in Meno) lists are insufficient

B)    Sense perception

1)    The view: Man is the measure of all things (Protagoras)

(a)   What we perceive is true to us; there are no misperceptions

(b)   No enduring object language: the epistemic analogue to Heraclitus’ flux ontology

2)    Two inconclusive arguments against Protagoras

(a)   Memory – I perceive, with my eyes, the goat as blue.  So I know the goat as blue.  When I look away, I remember the goat as blue.  But I'm no longer perceiving it, so I no longer know it.

(i)     Response: Socrates, speaking for Protagoras', responds that memory, in the context, counts as perception in that it's a “seeming-that.”

(b)   Wisdom – If knowledge is perception, how can one man be wiser than another, or for that matter, wiser than an animal (say, a tadpole) which can perceive?

(i)    Response: The wise are wise not by having truer perceptions, but better or more useful perceptions.

3)    Three better arguments against Protagoras:

(a)   Self-refutation.  Some people perceive knowledge as not being perception. 

(b)   Predictions:  When it comes to the question of whether a medicine will cure a disease, a doctor’s prediction is worth more than a layman’s.

(c)   Comparisons:  Our knowledge involves comparisons like bigger than, more than, etc.  But the predicates “bigger than” and “more than” aren't directly contained in the way things seem to us.  We get at them through reflection on the way things seem to us.  So knowledge can't be purely a matter of the way things seem to us.

4)    A key idea: sense objects only become for Plato, so they can’t be objects of knowledge (which is of what is)

C)    True opinion (belief)

1)    [Digression on the possibility of false belief (wax tablet, aviary) -- see Q#32 for details; I don’t think it’s needed for answering this question.]

2)    Counterexample:  a jury that comes to the correct verdict because they were persuaded by the lawyer's rhetoric.

D)   True opinion plus an account

1)    But account-giving breaks down at some point.  We can give an account of the name “Socrates” in terms of sigmas, omegas, chis, and so on.  But we can't give an account of the sigmas, omegas, and chis.  But if we can't do that, we can't really give an account of “Socrates” either. 

(a)   Roberts thinks Socrates suggests that in cases like this knowledge amounts to a sort of techne or acquaintance rather than an account.

III) Republic: True knowledge

A)   The divided line

1)    Knowledge contrasted with opinion – the difference is fundamentally in the object

(a)   Knowledge is of two types

(i)    Higher (= Understanding): of the universal, first principles, forms

(i)    Arrived at through dialectic; no use of images

(ii)  The result: insight

(ii)  Lower (= Thought): of mathematical truth, intelligible particulars

(i)    Uses images

(ii)  Result: conclusions

(b)   Opinion is of two types

(i)    Higher (= Belief): of “originals” (= images of the form?)

(ii)  Lower (= Imagination): of images (= images of images of the form?)

2)    One can progress up the line, convert opinion to knowledge through dialectic

B)    The allegory of the cave

1)    Parallels the divided line.  (I’m sure the parallels are clear)

C)    SUM: Knowledge is a grasping of the forms through dialectic

IV) Meno: The acquisition of knowledge

A)   Recollection

1)    Meno’s paradox

(a)   Without knowledge of X, you cannot investigate X.

(b)   With knowledge of X, there’s no need to investigate X.

2)    Solution

(a)   There is no learning; rather, we “learn” through recollection

(i)    Socrates: priests and wise men say the soul is immortal and was not always human; one dies and is reborn.  Knowledge, then, is recollection from one’s vast past experience (“the soul has learned everything”).

(ii)  Inquiry is important because it takes a process to recall truths already possessed.  At birth one already possesses all theoretical knowledge.

(b)   Slave boy example

(i)    The boy arrives at mathematical truth through dialectic

(i)    Slave boy: (1) starts out thinking he knows. (2) Through a series of questions (the answers to which come from within him), comes to see that his initial belief is false. (3) Is perplexed. (4) Through yet more questions, arrives at the right answer.

(ii)  The questions stir up what was in his soul already

(i)    The key point is that the entire process consisted of the boy answering questions out of his own head, without relying on an external source.  In short, the answer was arrived at by querying his own beliefs.

(ii)  The reincarnation bit isn't the core of the account.  The solution doesn't lie in knowledge gained in past lives, since that would only push the paradox back a few lifetimes.  Knowledge is gained in a disembodied state.  So the knowledge must be directly given to the soul.  This makes sense of why knowledge is seen as a gift from the gods.

(iii) Roberts: Learning is not just information-acquisition. Dialectic is importantly related to that aspect of knowledge that we call penetration or understanding, which may consist in seeing connections among pieces of information.  (Cf. Divided line stuff above)

(c)   It should be noted that later (in the Phaedo) this innate knowledge is seen to be knowledge of the Forms; they are the objects of knowledge.

(d)   If knowledge is recollection, then all learning is self-examination (as in the Apology, where the unexamined life is not worth living).  Thus a life without knowledge is not worth living. 

V)   Knowledge and the good life

A)   The digression in Theaetetus

1)    Some (e.g., Roberts) think this is the central piece of the Theaetetus.  It shows what is at stake in the rest of the dialogue.  The central issue – contrasting two intellectual characters: the philosopher vs. the epistemic slave.

B)    Education in Republic

1)    The divided line and cave allegory are set in the context of the moral education of the guardians, with the end of living well in the city.

C)    Knowledge and virtue in Meno

1)    Plato pictures virtue as a kind of knowledge.  Men always seek to do the good, even if they are often mistaken about the good.  If they knew the good they would do it.