Blake's Plato Questions

Hey, all!

I hope you are progressing well in your studies as well as enjoying your summers.  Below are my outlines for the Plato questions that were assigned to me.  You may not want to glance at them until later, but I thought I would go ahead and put them up now.  Should I send them through email as a document as well?

Best,
Blake

12. In Phaedo, Socrates claims that philosophy is a preparation for death and dying. Based on the discussion of the afterlife in Apology, Phaedo, and Republic, how would the practice of philosophy prepare one for this journey?

·      The short answer is this:  Philosophy prepares you for death by making you a good person, and a good person has nothing to fear from death—in fact, a good person should have good hope that they will fair very well in death.

·      In the Apology, Socrates is the least certain about what the afterlife will be like (though he gets increasingly confident towards the end of the dialogue).

o   He claims that he has “no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld” (29b).

o   He says that it is either (a) “a complete lack of perception, like a dreamless sleep,” (40c-d) or (b) a transition to another place.

§  If (a), then that’s not bad at all.  If (b), then a good man can be confident that he will fair well since he will go to face “true jurymen” (41a)—men who have been upright in their lives.

o   Though the notion of “good hope” is raised at the end of the dialogue (41c-d), the focus throughout the majority of the Apology seems to be that death is not something a philosopher should fear.

·      The notion of “good hope” that is raised in the Apology reaches fruition in the Republic and the Phaedo.

o   Both of these dialogues have myths about what the afterlife will be like.  Though they differ, there are important similarities:

§  Souls are judged according to what they have done and the state of their souls; good souls are rewarded with a blessed existence in a higher realm while bad souls are punished; exceptionally good/bad souls experience prolonged (perhaps eternal) reward/punishment.

o   The common thread is that the good are rewarded and the bad are punished.

§  There is no escape from the punishment of being bad except by making your soul as good as possible.

·      Note that this is contrary to what was said early in the Republic.  There Adeimantus suggested (on behalf of the unjust) that the wealthy unjust person could bribe the gods with sacrifices.

§  The conclusion is that we must care for our souls above all else, which is what philosophy does (when practiced the right way).

o   The Phaedo has a unique myth about the soul being guided after death.

§  When the soul separates from the body, it must be guided through the first part of the afterlife.

·      Those who became too intimate with their bodies and trusted in their sensations will not have a clean separation and will suffer much in this separation process.  They will finally be dragged away by their guide.  They will be lost and companionless.

·      Philosophers, who have practiced separating their souls from their bodies in philosophical investigation, will have a clean break from their bodies.  They will be familiar with their environment and will meet many companions along the way.

o   The Republic adds a unique feature by bringing in reincarnation.

§  We are given a choice about what sort of life we will have next.

§  Those who are good and wise in this life will select good and moderate lives in which their souls will fare well, but those who are bad and unwise will select poorly and suffer.

§  Not only can the philosopher have good hope that he or she will fare well in the afterlife, the philosopher can have good hope that he or she will fare well in the next life as well.

·      Important to understanding all of this is that, in Plato’s mind, a soul being virtuous and a soul being wise are intimately related and might even be the exact same thing.

o   Philosophy leads us to wisdom (or at least to the pursuit of wisdom above all else).  So if wisdom and virtue are the same, then philosophy leads us to become as virtuous and good as possible.

o   If you are wise and good, then your soul is the kind of soul that dwells among the Forms.  That is what your soul longed for during life and tried to attain by investigating things in the intelligible realm.

§  This harkens back to the Phaedo.  There Socrates argues that philosophers are used to separating their souls from their bodies during investigation of the intelligible realm.  Undergoing this sort of investigation means they (a) are able to make a clean break from their bodies during death, (b) are familiar and comfortable existing without a body, and (c) enjoy separation from the body since they can know the Forms more intimately without bodily distractions.

o   If you are a philosopher, at death your soul will be the kind of soul that seeks to be in the presence of the Forms and is capable of such a noble existence.  On the other hand, if you are wicked and unwise then your soul will shun the Forms nor will it be the sort of soul that can be admitted into their company.

§  You might think about the Cave here.  People who are not used to the real world are pained by the bright light and shun it.  Philosophers, however, run towards the light.  So in the afterlife, philosophers get to enjoy the real world while the souls of those who did not practice philosophy remain in the cave.

·      So philosophy makes us into the kind of people that can and will enjoy the rewards of the afterlife (and the next life as well).

17. According to Plato, what is the nature of the soul’s powers? How are the cardinal virtues related to the proper functioning of the soul? How does the structure of a good society compensate for the natural limits to individuals’ development of these virtues?

·      There are three parts of an ideal city.

o   Ruling: directs others from a knowledge of what is good

o   Guarding: guard city from dangers and regulate workers

o   Working-class: fulfill their functions and obey their superiors

·      These parts of a city have corresponding parts in a human soul with corresponding powers.

o   First reason is distinguished from the appetitive part.

§  The same thing cannot do and not do the same action, or desire and not desire to do the same action at the same time.

§  Humans desire to drink because thirsty and do not desire to drink because the drink is poisoned at the same time, so different parts must be at work.

o   The spirited part is distinguished from reason and appetite

§  It is not reason or the calculating part because it is a source of emotion and anger, and reason sometimes has to calm the spirited part down with soothing speeches

§  It is not the appetitive part because it often sides with reason against the appetitive part.

·      Such as in the case of Leontius looking at the dead bodies

·      The cardinal virtues consist in the proper functioning and relation of these parts amongst each other, the same as in the city.

o   Courage: The spirited part preserves through pleasures and pains what has been proclaimed by reason about that which should inspire terror and that which should not.

o   Wisdom: Knowledge in ruling part of what is beneficial for each part and for the whole composed of the community of these three parts.

o   Moderation (Temperance): The ruling part (reason) and the two ruled parts are of the single opinion that the ruling part ought to rule and don’t raise faction.

§  Doesn’t reside in one part but is in the relations of the three parts to each other.

o   Justice: each of the parts of the soul does it’s own work (the work for which it is most naturally suited) and does not meddle in the work of the other parts.

§  Like moderation, justice is in the relations of the three parts.

§  Socrates says that justice, as defined here, is what makes possible the courage, wisdom, and temperance of the city/soul and sustains them.

·      How does the structure of a good society compensate for the natural limits to individuals development of these virtues?

o   The structure of the just city seems most concerned with the virtue of its guardians (its rulers and auxiliaries).

§  The measures put in place to protect and cultivate the virtue of the guardians are discussed below.

§  As far as the working class, it doesn’t seem as if the just city is really structured to make these workers virtuous.  Perhaps this is because the “natural limits” of those in the working class prevent them from ever becoming fully virtuous.  At most, the just city is structured to keep them in line and doing their jobs.

·      They are told the “noble lie” (the myth of the metals) to get them to submit to the rule of the best.

·      The auxiliary guardians are trained to be able to keep the working class in line should they disobey.

·      The rulers are educated in order to keep the working class from experiencing poverty or wealth so that they aren’t inclined to abandon their jobs or revolt.

·      They are given a single job, allowing them to excel at their craft without distraction.

o   Because the wisdom and courage of the city lies in the rulers and the auxiliaries, respectively, the city is structured to cultivate these virtues in each respective class.

§  Wisdom – The city is structured to cultivate wisdom in the ruler guardians.

·      First of all, the most promising individuals are selecting for guardian training from childhood.

o   We select the children that are naturally talented and philosophical—by philosophical I mean that they naturally shun wealth, pleasure, and honor in favor of learning.

·      All of this education is first and foremost to cultivate the cardinal virtues in the guardians.

o   They are given rigorous musical and physical education with the aim of increasing virtue.

·      A large part of helping these guardians become virtuous is by preventing their corruption during their youth.

o   Their musical and physical training is censored.

§  Only allow certain kinds of music; ban certain stories; don’t allow people to imitate certain kinds of characters; take the children to the battlefield to watch ongoing wars; etc.

o   They are not allowed to own things or even touch anything made of gold or silver so as to prevent them from being tempted by wealth.

·      Even so, only the best of the best get to become ruler guardians and receive more rigorous education.

o   We turn the faculties of the ruler guardians upward through arithmetic, geometry, 3-D geometry, astronomy, and finally dialectic.

·      Through these methods they come to know the Form of the Good, which makes them completely virtuous.

o   Hence, all of the mechanisms put in place to bring the rulers into knowledge of the Good are also ways in which the city is set up to promote the virtue of the ruler guardians.

§  Courage – The city is structured to cultivate courage in the auxiliary guardians.

·      The auxiliary guardians receive all of the same musical and physical training as the ruler guardians.

·      Because of the musical training, the guardians are in complete agreement with the lawful prescriptions about what is terrifying and what is not.

·      Because of the physical training, the guardians are tough and able to withstand the hardships or delights (the pleasures or pains) that might make them abandon these beliefs.

o   They eat plain food and live in unluxurious quarters and are used to hardship.

·      Thus, all these measures promote the individual courage of the guardians. 

22. How does the slave boy episode function philosophically and rhetorically in Meno? Does it prove what Socrates thinks it proves? Do you find Socrates’ position here plausible?

·      The slave boy episode is a response to Meno’s knowability paradox (also called the “debator’s argument”).

o   Knowability paradox:  You either know X or you don’t.  If you know X, then you don’t need to inquire into X.  If you don’t know X, then you won’t know how to appropriately inquire into X nor will you be able to tell if you have found X in your inquiry.

o   Socrates resolves this paradox by showing that having true beliefs about X is an adequate beginning for inquiry.  When these true beliefs, which seem to be innately present in people, are properly and repeatedly stimulated through questioning, then one can come to understand the reasons behind the truth of these opinions.  In this way one can recollect what one previously knew but had forgotten.

o   Let’s see this play out in the slave boy episode:

§  Socrates draws out the opinions of the slave boy through questioning.  He notes that the boy did not get these opinions from a teacher but has them innately within himself.

§  The slave boy has false opinions at first and reaches aporia before eventually arriving at the true opinion.

·      Socrates’s questions seem too helpful to me (he would be fairly accused of “leading the witness” in my mind), but he insists that he is merely drawing out a true opinion that existed previously within the boy.

·      If this opinion is present in the boy for his entire present life, then it must have been put in him before his present life.

§  After this, Socrates insists that if the boy were to run through this line of questioning again and again, he would come to understand the explanation behind his true opinion and would thereby come to know it.

·      But since this true opinion was in him all along, he would simply be recollecting knowledge that he previously lost.

·      Learning, then, is merely recollection.

o   Philosophically, I’m not sure that Socrates’s response to the knowability paradox relies too heavily on his doctrine of recollection.  The main point is to show that productive inquiry is possible; and Socrates can show this without relying on recollection.

§  Socrates’s solution to the knowability paradox is to show that having true opinions about something can be enough to begin productive inquiry.

·      This interpretation fits well with the rest of the dialogue in which Socrates says that true opinion, though not as valuable as knowledge, can still lead us to right action.

§  Though recollection provides us one way to explain how we have these true opinions, it doesn’t seem like the only way.

·      In fact, at the end of the episode Socrates hints that he doesn’t insist that the doctrine of recollection is true but only that productive inquiry is possible (86b).

§  It seems charitable not to make Socrates’s argument rely too much on recollection, since his demonstration with the slave boy doesn’t seem strong enough in my mind to prove that recollection occurs.

·       Of course, one difficulty with this interpretation is that Cebes in the Phaedo says that the slave boy demonstration (or something like it) is a strong proof of recollection.

·      But if we are able to make the doctrine of recollection peripheral to the main argument, then it seems as if Socrates might have a better claim at having proven his overall point.

§  Also, the rhetorical focus of this episode seems to be more about the possibility of productive inquiry (learning) than it does about the specific doctrine of recollection.  See below.  This indicates that recollection is not his main philosophical point.

·      Rhetorically, the demonstration with the slave boy is focused on the possibility of learning and how that might occur.

o   Meno has been a fairly difficult and reluctant interlocutor so far.

§  After giving a definition by example, he makes Socrates try to define “shape” before finally giving another definition of virtue.  Then he gets frustrated when Socrates “numbs” him and makes him reach aporia.  Then he brings up a Sophistical argument about inquiry being pointless.

o   It’s essential, in Socrates’s mind, that one believes in the possibility of productive inquiry.

§  He says that if we doubt the possibility of learning, then we will become “idle” and “fainthearted” whereas those who believe in the possibility of learning will be “energetic and keen on the search” (81d-e).  “I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know that that we must not look for it.” (86b-c)

o   So Socrates’s demonstration with the slave boy is meant to encourage Meno, and us, about the possibility of coming to know new things.

§  Along the way, Socrates also indicates that aporia is a necessary and beneficial step in the process of learning (Socrates is a torpedo fish that “numbs” both Meno and the slave boy, but this isn’t bad).  Again, this is meant to encourage Meno and us not to be discouraged when we reach this point in our inquiry.

§  It is also a nice demonstration of how the dialectic works.

·      The questioning leads to self-reflection.

·      Socrates serves as midwife, throwing out the false opinions until a true one comes along.

·      Personally, I tend to agree with Socrates’s main philosophical and rhetorical points:  We can use true beliefs to productively inquire into what we don’t already know and it is vital to our character that we believe this.

27. At Phaedo 96–100, Socrates gives an intellectual autobiography. What are the details of that biography and how does it help us distinguish Socrates’ views from the views of the pre-Socratic naturalistic philosophers?

·      Details of the biography

o   He sets up this biography in response to Cebes argument that the soul may be worn out after many lives like a used cloak. He gives his intellectual autobiography because Cebes’ question has to do with “the cause of generation and destruction.”  The intellectual autobiography is given with this specific subject in view.

o   Socrates’ short-lived romance with natural science

§  Socrates says he loved the natural sciences because it was pleasing to know the cause of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists.

·      He asked questions such as “Do we think with our blood?” and investigated “what happens to things in the sky and on the earth” (96b).

§  But then Socrates has a serious problem:  this type of study does not adequately explain causation.

o   He gives the example of growth.  The problem appears to be that opposite things can account for most cases of becoming. Sometimes the answer is two by subtraction, sometimes by addition (i.e. one thing can become two things by bringing it close to another thing or one thing can become two things by dividing or separating it).  But opposite causes should not be able to produce the same results.  The cause could not be adding or subtraction, then.

o   Anaxagoras

§  Then explains how he heard of Anaxagoras’ account that “it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything.” (97c) Socrates thought that Anaxagoras would show that the directing mind gives order to everything and makes sure everything is best; thus, the true cause of everything would be that it was best for it to be that way.  Knowing the best way for a thing to be, therefore, was to know the cause of a thing. So one need only investigate what is best.

§  He was excited for two reasons

·      Intelligibility – The true cause of things (that it is best for it to be that way) is intelligible.  The problem he ran into when looking for physical causes (causes among the visible realm) was that nothing was pure or stable.  But a wholly intelligible and invisible cause of things might escape those problems.

·      Meaning - “Once he had given the best for each as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all.” (98b)

§  Problem with Anaxagoras – Socrates read everything of Anaxagoras. But Anaxagoras made no real use of Mind in the management of things.

·      Said it is like saying Socrates’ actions are due to mind, then explaining the bones and sinews as the cause of him sitting.

·      Therefore, Anaxagoras’ theory was not really any different from anyone who came before. They cannot distinguish real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause.

·      All the natural philosophers cannot say what the best is. They do not believe that the good holds everything together.

·      How does it distinguish Socrates from Pre-Socratic naturalistic philosophers?

o   Distinction of understanding of causes

§  The Pre-Socratics looked for the causes of things among the visible realm.  Socrates, however, saw that the visible realm was not the sort of thing in which stable, pure (unmixed) causes could be found (see above for why).  The real cause of things needed to be something purely intelligible.  The visible realm is that which these intelligible causes act on.

§  Furthermore, the Pre-Socratics (with the exception of the Sophists who did not engage in natural science) neglected the moral side of things.  They conducted their investigations without any consideration to the good.  Socrates, on the other hand, intimately connects the true cause of things with the good.  For example, in the Republic Socrates seems to say that the Good is the first principle that organizes all of reality and provides for the being and knowability of the intelligible world.  So Socrates unites metaphysics and ethics.

o   Distinction of method

§  Socrates decided he would investigate by discussions and by means of words. Fundamentally, he would look at the best things.  This is very different from the Pre-Socratic naturalistic philosophers who conducted empirical investigations and concerned themselves with the visible realm.

·      This change in method is a natural consequence of how he understands causes.  If the real causes of things are intelligible, then you should investigate matters by reason alone.

§  This leads Socrates to the forms–the Beautiful or Good itself. He is honest and says that he just assumes that there are forms (though he later says that one should eventually give an account of this assumption and work his way upward).  Everything that is beautiful is so because it shares in the forms.

32. What are the various perplexities that emerge as Socrates and Theaetetus discuss

the question of false belief?

·      All of these puzzles center on the possibility of false belief.

o   The interpretation I favor is that Plato thinks that these are genuinely difficult puzzles for “empiricist” theories that want to build beliefs and their content entirely out of perceptions.  Plato thinks that his theory of knowledge, however, has a way out of these dilemmas.

o   If a theory can’t account for false beliefs, then it will run into a criticism that was made earlier in the Theaetetus—namely that no man could be considered wiser than any other.  Even more, if beliefs are the sort of things that are by nature true or false, then a theory that cannot account for false beliefs may not be able to account for beliefs at all.

·      The first puzzle:

o   For everything, a man either knows it or he doesn’t.

o   Say that we are trying to explain how it is that a man can have a false judgment about Y.

o   Obviously the man cannot know Y and have a false judgment about Y.  So he must not know Y.

o   It couldn’t be that he thinks that X, which he knows, is really Y, which he doesn’t know, or that Y, which he doesn’t know, is really X, which he knows.  If he knows X then he knows whether X is Y or not and so couldn’t have a false judgment about this.

o   Neither could it be that he thinks that X, which he doesn’t know, is Y, which he doesn’t know.  For “is it possible that a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?” (188b)

§  This isn’t obvious to me.  Presumably Plato’s thinking is that to have a thought about something you must be at least acquainted with it and if you are acquainted with it then you know it.  At least, this sounds like something an empiricist might have to say.

·      Second puzzle:  Socrates then suggests that false judgment happens when someone judges what is not.

o   But one cannot judge what is not.  Whenever someone judges, he judges something.  And what is not is nothing.  So all judgments must be about what is.

§  This reminds me of an argument Gorgias made.

·      Third puzzle:  Socrates then suggests that false judgment happens when someone judges one thing that is to be some other thing that is (call this “other-judging”).

o   Perhaps false judgment might be judging of something that is in place of another something that is.  When we say of a beautiful thing that it is ugly, we substitute one reality in place of another reality.

o   But this seems wrong.  How could one seriously propose that the beautiful is the ugly or that a cow is a horse?  “Thus a man who has both things before his mind when he judges cannot possibly judge that one is the other.”

o   And “if he has only one of them before his mind in judging and the other is not present to him at all, he will never judge that one is the other.”

o   So on this third hypothesis of false judgment both objects have to be present in the mind for false judgment to occur, but if both are present clearly, false judgment will not occur.

·      Fourth puzzle:  After this, Socrates returns to his first attempt (judging that things that one knows are things that one doesn’t know).  He suggests a wax model.

o   Some perceptions get imprinted into the wax in one’s soul and remain there.  These are our thoughts.  Later, when we have more perceptions, we compare these new perceptions to our thoughts.  In our wax analogy, we line up a new seal with the imprints that are already in our wax block to see if they line up correctly.  Sometimes we are wrong about whether a seal correctly aligns with the imprint in the wax, just as we are sometimes wrong about whether a new perception aligns with the thought that is in our head.

§  “[False judgment] arises not in the relation of perceptions to one another, or of thoughts to one another, but in the connecting of perception with thought.” (195d)

o   The problem with this theory (or one of the problems) is that there are false beliefs that cannot be explained in this way (e.g. false beliefs about mathematics).  It’s not always the case that false beliefs arise from a mismatching of a current perception to the memory or thought of a previous perception.

·      Fifth puzzle:  Socrates then suggest the aviary model.

o   Our souls are like aviaries, and when we catch a piece of knowledge and put it in our souls it is like we are catching a bird and placing it in a cage.  When we do this we possess this knowledge (the bird is in the cage), but we don’t always have this knowledge (the bird isn’t always in our hands).

o   So when we are trying to grab a bird that is in our cage, we may make a mistake and grab the wrong bird.  For example, when we are asked what 5+7 is we try to grab 12 but we mistakenly grab 11.  Perhaps this is where false judgment comes from.

o   The problem with this theory is the same problem that has loomed over most of these puzzles:  How could the man mistake one bird for another bird?  Did we accidentally catch 11 because we thought that 11 was 12?  But this seems impossible (given the first puzzle).  The aviary model doesn’t do anything to answer these puzzles.

·      Socrates ends by saying that they should not have started talking about false judgment without figuring out what knowledge was first.

o   This reiterates what he said a little earlier in this false judgment discussion when he said that they should not be talking about what knowledge is like until they know what knowledge is.